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A MARXIST CRITIQUE OF INDIAN STALINISM


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THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL ON CHILE

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PERSPECTIVES FOR SOCIALIST REVOLUTION  
IN THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT

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# CONTENTS

1. EDITORIAL NOTE P. 2
2. PERSPECTIVES FOR SOCIALIST REVOLUTION P. 3  
IN THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT — Upali Cooray.
3. THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL ON CHILE P. 35
4. A MARXIST CRITIQUE OF INDIAN STALINISM P. 42  
— Prit Sappal.

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Signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the Editorial Committee



# EDITORIAL NOTE

This magazine is produced by a group of revolutionary marxists from South Asia who are temporarily resident in Western Europe and North America. Our aim is fairly simple. We intend this journal to be a forum for discussion and debate amongst marxists from South Asia and marxists in Europe and America working on the problems related either to a component of or the sub-continent as a whole.

There are number of reasons why it is necessary to produce a magazine of this sort in Europe. The most important factor, however, is that while repression would make its production impossible in some countries of South Asia what is more important is that it is impossible for socialists in India and Bangladesh to communicate with socialists from Pakistan and vice versa at the present time. Therefore the production of a journal of this sort could be of assistance to the revolutionary movement throughout the sub-continent. We hope that this will be a temporary phase and that coming together of the bourgeoisie of India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Bangladesh will permit the improvement and establishment of channels of communications between the working class movement as well.

The present issue contains tentative and initial discussion on the tasks task of Indian revolution, the impasse in which the official communist (i.e. Stalinist) movement in India now finds itself and we also publish the statement of the Fourth International on Chile, since in our view the collapse of the Popular Unity and the imposition of a military dictatorship has important lessons for the practitioners of coalition politics and the parliamentary road to socialism.

In brief this journal is a result of events which shook the South asian sub-continent in 1971: the establishment of Bangladesh, the repression in West Bengal and the ferocity with which the coalition government of Ceylon (containing 'communists' and ex-trotskyists) crushed the Popular Liberation Front of that country and incarcerated tens of thousands of youth in concentration camps. What 1971 also showed was the role of China in these events, a factor of some significance, which led to the decline and disintegration of Maoism in India. If in the minds of many, the Soviet bureaucracy was associated with the preservation of the status quo and the preservation of its own narrow caste interests, from 1971 onwards few honest marxists could nurture any illusions regarding the supposedly revolutionary line of the Great Helmsman. The People's Republic of China has over the last few years followed a policy which has in reality been qualitatively no different from that of the Soviet Union. Whereas the latter chose to engage in class collaboration with the Indian bourgeoisie, Peking chose as its 'friends' the oligarchy which ruled Pakistan since 1958. During the repression in Ceylon, Chou en lai wrote one of his notorious letters to Mrs. Bandaranaike to disassociate the Chinese from the JVP and attack them as "adventurists", "ultralefts", "a handful of conspirators" etc. The same phrases were



being bandied about by the assassins and hangmen of the Ceylonese revolution, Bandaranaike, Keuneman and Perera.

It has been the Chinese turn which has made it more vital than ever before to establish a new revolutionary politics in the sub-continent. To break many sincere revolutionaries from the myths and shibboleths of Indian Stalinism; to struggle against the idea that marxism = incense burning before statues, photographs or books of either J.V. Stalin or M.T. Tung. To revitalise the marxist tradition and create a new revolutionary practice is our aim. If this magazine is successful in persuading many sub-continental revolutionaries to return to Leninism and via Lenin to Trotsky and other blotted out writings, then we will have been successful. A number of the editorial board members are members of the Fourth International, others are not attached to any organisation. To a large extent the success of this magazine will depend on the support of friends in Europe and we would urge all concerned to enter the discussion, get in touch with us by subscribing to the magazine, which we aim to produce twice a year initially, and thus make possible its dispatch to all four corners of South Asia.

## PERSPECTIVES FOR SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT

### I The Colonial Revolution and the Imperialist Strategy

After the 1914 war, revolution and economic crisis in the metropolitan imperialist countries weakened these powers vis-a-vis their colonial satellites. For example, war disrupted trade and thus protected the markets in the colonial and semi-colonial countries from the imported manufactures of the Metropolis. The depression, by radically cutting the export revenues from the sale of primary commodities necessitated tariffs to cut down on imports; it also directly hit the big landowners and the comprador bourgeoisie whose interests lay in the perpetuation of the classical colonial 'export-import' economy. The fear of revolutionary upheavals together with its weakened position, com-

pelled imperialism to make concessions to the tiny national bourgeoisie that had emerged, after World War I, here and there in the colonial world. In these more favourable conditions the national bourgeoisie—oriented to production for local markets—managed to thrive and grow. An industrial capitalist sector emerged in many of the colonial countries alongside the remnants of the pre-capitalist modes of production creating a combined socio-economic formation in which the indigenous capitalism was increasingly dominant.

Inter-imperialist rivalry broke out again in an explosive manner in World War II. The declining specific weight of Britain and France in the world economy was out of all proportion to the magnitude of the colonial possessions of these countries and therefore the axis powers attempted a re-division of the World. World War II, however, weakened all the major powers apart from American imperialism which emerged with a hegemonic position in the world capitalist system. In this new world situation, a considerably enfeebled British imperialism was compelled, in the rising tide of colonial revolution after the war, to replace direct rule of its colonies by a strategy of neo-colonialism. This meant essentially the transfer of political power to the national bourgeoisie—the power of the autonomous state apparatus being passed to the indigenous ruling social forces. Within this set up the American bourgeoisie was able considerably to increase its influence over these ex-colonial countries to the detriment of the ex-colonial powers.

After the acute unrest and tensions that accompanied the winning of 'Independence' the indigenous elite succeeded in stabilising their class rule. Those who had been most closely tied to the imperialist power—in India the Princes and Zamindars—lost some of their influence in the new orders but by no means suffered expropriation. As for the other dominant classes, they remain in the last analysis economically and militarily dependent upon imperialism. However they have been able, in the international sphere, to take advantage of the rivalry between imperialism and the Workers' states; Russian and American competition for influence in India is a case in point. They have also been able to exploit the sharpening competition between the imperialist countries. Moreover it would be untrue to say that the state apparatuses in India, Ceylon, Pakistan, etc. are mainly, or primarily, concerned with the protection of imperialist interests. In other words the elites of these countries have been able to forge strong, centralised and relatively autonomous state apparatuses primarily serving the interests of the social forces that constitute the ruling classes of these countries—that is an alliance between the numerically small urban bourgeoisie and the rural elite.

What distinguishes the rural elite from the bourgeoisie is that it still depends upon the pre-capitalist forms of exploitation, whilst functioning within a system of capitalist property relations.

The alliance on which the state is based is not totally non-antagonistic. The bourgeoisie (which is dominant in the alliance in India) would like to speed up the pace of agrarian change, increase the size of the rural market, and tax agriculture for economic and industrial development. But to take the radical measures necessary to achieve these tasks would bring the bourgeoisie into conflict with the rural elite and thus threaten their alliance. This in turn would create dangerous instability in which the workers and poor peasants could impose their own solutions. Such a perspective is rightly feared by the ruling classes; as a result the tensions of opposing interests in the ruling bloc are reflected in the fact that, while the state takes strong measures to suppress rebellion among the workers or poor peasants it is too weak to take even the minimum measures necessary to stimulate rapid economic development. The inability of the states in the Indian sub-continent to implement real land reform or impose agricultural taxation are obvious examples of this.

While in the Indian sub-continent the colonial revolution was successfully diverted into relatively safe channels, this was not the case elsewhere on the globe. The colonial revolution proved to be much more resilient than was anticipated by imperialism. The most important landmark was the victory of the Chinese revolution, which substantially altered the balance of forces in the Asian political arena. The enormous impact of the Chinese revolution undoubtedly alarmed the imperialist countries and when the Korean war broke out they immediately stepped in to halt this 'dangerous trend'. Despite this, and despite the determined efforts to stamp out 'terrorism' in Malaya, the Colonial revolution continued to sap the strength of imperialism as demonstrated by the humiliating defeat of the French at Dienbienphu.

American imperialism rapidly assimilated the lessons of these setbacks and recognised the necessity of taking more elaborate measures to hold back the advance of the anti-imperialist struggles which were now threatening to go beyond the limits and norms imperialism was prepared to tolerate. American imperialism now took the initiative in setting up more permanent structures to deal with the growing 'communist subversion' in Asia; SEATO and CENTO was created, direct and indirect 'aid' was generously allocated to ensure the stability of those regimes servile to imperialism and to undermine those regimes which threatened stability in the area. The relative ease with which imperialism was able to pursue such policies was due to two important factors: they were (a) the treacherous role of Stalinism crystallised in its policies of peaceful co-existence, support of progressive national bourgeois regimes, etc. and (b) the relative quiescence in the class struggle of the advanced capitalist countries of the West and Japan. Stalinism through its horse-deals with imperialism such as Yalta, Postdam, Geneva etc; through treacherous betrayals of revolutionary struggles e.g. Greece; by crushing the anti-bureaucratic struggles in East



Germany, Hungary, Poland, etc. and by forming alliances with the 'progressive national bourgeois regimes' e.g. India, Indonesia etc. weakened the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggles and became a major obstacle to the socialist revolution.

In countries like France and Italy the Stalinist parties had provided valuable assistance to the bourgeois forces who were substantially weakened by World War II. Once the bourgeoisie of these countries regained its balance the United States provided massive economic aid under the Marshall plan, which brought about a temporary stabilisation of capitalism in the metropolitan countries.

This coupled with the new technological advances which triggered off the third industrial revolution, enabled the ruling classes of the Metropolitan countries to grant important concessions to their working class. These two factors undoubtedly enabled imperialism to take bolder and more audacious steps to halt the advance of the world revolutionary process. Thus immediately after the victory of the Cuban revolution, imperialism scored a number of successes, the most notable of them being the counter-revolutionary coup in Indonesia.

The defeat in Indonesia was undoubtedly a severe blow to the forces of world revolution; but it also marked the beginning of a new stage in the international class struggle. Petty-bourgeois nationalist leaderships which tried to contain anti-imperialist struggles of the masses and which prevented such struggles taking an anti-capitalist direction — such as Sukarno of Indonesia, Goulart of Brazil etc.—were rapidly eliminated by imperialism. The military involvement of the United States in Vietnam marked the high point of the Imperialist counter-offensive; enormous amount of men, money and resources were marshalled and deployed against the Vietnamese masses. The tenacity and the heroism with which the Vietnamese revolutionary forces fought this barbaric aggression succeeded not only in demystifying the 'invincibility' of American imperialism but also succeeded in (a) stemming the tide of the imperialist counter-revolutionary advance—American imperialism suffered defeats not only in Vietnam but also in Cambodia and Laos. (b) Radicalising thousands of people all over the world, particularly youth and (c) accentuating the social contradictions within the United States itself.

The struggle of the Vietnamese people has driven home a number of important lessons to the oppressed masses—particularly to militants—all over the world. These lessons are (a) that even the most powerful imperialist power with the most sophisticated war machine cannot always impose its will on the oppressed people provided the latter are prepared to put up a determined resistance (b) that even at the most decisive stage of such a struggle the bureaucrats of Moscow and Peking are prepared to trade in such struggles and to subordinate them to their own narrow diplomatic needs and (c) today, more than

ever, it is necessary to build a revolutionary leadership on an international scale—independent of both Moscow and Peking—in order to ensure the victory of such revolutionary struggles. These lessons have been underscored by the manner in which the Maoist bureaucracy act in relation to the Bangladesh struggle and the JVP uprising in Ceylon. The failure of the OLAS and the 'third Communist Front' (Cuba, North Korea and North Vietnam)—which hardly got off the ground—has created a very favourable objective situation to further clarify various confusions that were current amongst militants and to win literally thousands to revolutionary marxism.

The experience of Vietnam has also driven home a number of lessons to American imperialism. Unable to impose its solution in the conflict it has been forced to re-orient its strategy not just in Vietnam but on a world scale. As it will find it much more difficult to wage sustained wars of direct intervention against the revolutionary forces, American imperialism has sought, through massive military and other aid, to build up the military/bureaucratic apparatuses in certain regional powers such as Brazil and Iran. Simultaneously, American imperialism has stepped up its efforts to strengthen the internal capitalist forces in the colonial and semi-colonial world. More will be said of these efforts below but it should be noted that they tie in with the increased economic re-alignment of the imperialist bourgeoisie and the neo-colonial industrial bourgeoisie.

The classic pattern of imperialism was of a national bourgeoisie with a limited conflict with imperialism for the market of the colonial country. The imperialist bourgeoisie and its indigenous allies in the colonies wanted a free trade relationship entailing an exchange of primary commodities for the manufactures of the imperialist countries. The indigenous national bourgeoisie, on the other hand, wanted tariffs and protection from imperialist manufactures. Now, the imperialist powers have re-oriented their strategy—for the reasons already outlined such as the inability of imperialism to hold back the permanent revolutionary process, the sharpening inter-imperialist competition etc—by collaborating in the industrial ventures of the national bourgeoisie through joint ventures and collaboration schemes; in this way imperialism participates in the industrial enterprises of the indigenous bourgeoisie. Thus for both economic and political reasons, the imperialists wish to see a strengthening of the indigenous capitalist forces and the growth in productive forces. They hope this will stabilise these economies and halt the spread of the Indo-Chinese example.

The strengthening of the internal process of capital accumulation—for example in agriculture with the development of the Green Revolution—has in no wise mitigated the social contradictions of the countries concerned. On the contrary the conditions of the poor masses have deteriorated as a result of such efforts. Equally important, however, is the fact that this process has

begun to weaken the socio-political grip of the rural elite on the rural masses. This realignment of forces—between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism on one hand and the rural elite and the bourgeoisie on the other—accounts not only for the vacillations of and tensions within ruling alliances such as the Congress Party of India but also accounts for the 'new' populism of such alliances. It represents the efforts of the bourgeoisie to appeal to the rural masses over the heads of the rural elite. Conversely, these developments also reinforce the permanent revolutionary process by augmenting the ranks of the rural proletariat and weakening the economic, political and ideological grip of the rural elite. The colonial revolution has not only continued to rise on a world scale but has increasingly taken a new meaning. Today it increasingly represents a revolutionary rise against the indigenous national bourgeoisie in alliance with imperialism—i.e. a socialist revolution.

The deepening contradictions within the Metropolis and the upsurge of working class struggles in the advanced capitalist countries, have important repercussions within the Indian sub-continent. On the one hand the slow down in the economic growth, the falling rates of profits and the development of unused capacity in the advanced capitalist countries reduces the ability of countries like India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Bangladesh to substantially increase their exports to the West and Japan. Still a substantial part of their exports is made up of primary products such as Jute and Tea and the demand for these products in the world market has been declining for some time now, while their supplies have substantially increased. On the other hand, the import prices and import costs of these countries—due to inflation in the advanced capitalist countries and increase in the import content of industries in the neo-colonial countries—have continued to rise. This has brought about a chronic imbalance in the balance of payments and a huge increase in the external debts of India, Pakistan and Ceylon. These circumstances have also militated against the diversification of these economies. Thus the weakening of American imperialism, the sharpening inter-imperialist competition and the upsurge of the working class struggles in the West tends to further accentuate the problems of the indigenous bourgeoisie in the Indian sub-continent. In the absence of a thoroughgoing programme of industrialisation and agrarian reform, not only have unemployment, landlessness etc. taken crisis proportions but also have brought to the fore other unresolved social problems such as caste oppression and the national question. The resulting intensification of social tensions has brought about a potentially explosive situation. In the following pages we shall attempt to analyse in detail some of these developments and seek to draw the conclusions that flow from them.

## II The Class Nature of the Semi-Colonial states

As has already been argued, at the time of 'Independence' the



dominant groupings were the industrial elite and the rural elite of landlords and big peasants. In this coalition the bourgeoisie occupied an important, though not a hegemonic, position. Seeking the development of the productive forces within the confines of private property the State's economic development programmes have consistently ensured the flow of benefits to the big industrial bourgeoisie. Apart from this the bourgeoisie has been able to influence the policy decisions and their implementations by various other means—e.g. financing the Congress machine by their control over the news media and their sustained access to the bureaucracy etc.

While big business wields enormous power and controls a highly concentrated and interlocked industrial structure, it is numerically a very small social layer. Therefore it cannot and does not exercise political power alone. Particularly at the regional level of the states in the Indian Union, the landlords and the big peasants—who also dominate the rural society—often in alliance with the smaller regional bourgeoisie, control the Legislative Assemblies and the local bureaucracy. Since the rural elite exercise enormous political power at the level of the states, in India's federal political structure and since it is the states that have powers under the constitution to deal with such crucial topics as the agrarian reforms and agricultural taxation, it is needless to say that the landlords have neither been prepared to expropriate themselves through radical agrarian reforms nor to tax their own agricultural incomes. This is an important barrier against rapid industrial expansion and thus runs counter to the interests of the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie.

On the other hand the rural elite - through their economic and social control over the rural masses -- ensures the stability of the system. This apart, the rural elite also provides an important market for industry as well as agrarian inputs necessary for the urban economy. In 1960/61 the rural market for industrial consumer goods was Rs. 4,600 crores as compared with an urban market of Rs. 1,600 crores; and of this Rs. 4,600 crores, the richest 10% of the rural population consumed 34.6%. Again in 1960/61, 8.57% of the population in the rural areas of India provided 47.49% of the marketable surplus of agriculture. Thus the alliance of the bourgeoisie and the rural elite in the political super-structure reflects both contradictory and mutual interests of these two social layers.

Given this linkage, the bourgeoisie would like to see a faster growth of rural demand for industrial products and the supply of agriculture inputs to sustain expansion. It would also like to tax agriculture to secure a sustained flow of finance and foodgrains that the state could use in the industrialisation process. But the constricting hold of the Landlords and the big peasants on the rural society prevents this.

The leverage of the bourgeoisie over the state and thereby over the economy is also reduced by the important semi-autonomous interests of the state bureaucracy. This bureaucracy is partly an inheritance from the colonial regime - the colonial being "equipped with a powerful

bureaucratic-military apparatus and mechanisms of government which enables through its routine operations to subordinate the native social classes ..... At the moment of Independence the weak indigenous bourgeoisie find themselves enmeshed in bureaucratic controls by which those at the top of the bureaucratic-military apparatus of the state are able to maintain and even extend their dominant power in the society being freed from metropolitan control" 1. The state's economic development programmes and growth of a large public sector have further strengthened the influence of the state bureaucracy. Whereas, for example in Japan, the state built up a large industrial sector which it subsequently sold off to big capital at knock down prices, in India, for instance, this is not the case. Since such a step would inevitably benefit the monopoly houses, it would be opposed by smaller capital who exercise some power within the ruling alliance. Thus the weakness and the lack of cohesion in the indigenous ruling forces finds its expression in a high degree of autonomy of the state bureaucracy.

In Pakistan there is, if anything, even more autonomy for the army and the civil service. At Independence there was virtually no industry or an industrial bourgeoisie at all either in West or East Pakistan. The Pakistani ruling class never possessed a strong political party able to mystify and control the masses and very quickly the facade of 'parliamentary democracy' was cast away. After 1947 the Muslim League degenerated into quarrelsome and corrupt cliques that discredited themselves very rapidly. What held the Pakistani State together in this period were two important forces of the army and civil service - which acted as agents of the indigenous ruling class as well as imperialism. The military takeover of 1958 was, therefore, merely a formalization of military bureaucratic rule that had long been a reality. Both the army and the civil service had been trained in the British imperial traditions and recruited mainly from West Pakistan. The main group on whom industrial development was based was a small group of Bombay merchants who had fled after the partition, bringing their wealth with them to West Pakistan; there they ingratiated themselves with the army and the civil service. This tiny industrial bourgeoisie has been able to sustain a relatively rapid industrial expansion in West Pakistan through exploitation of East Pakistan - now Bangladesh -- as an internal colony and through the ruthless exploitation of the industrial proletariat. The converse side of the coin has been the relatively slow development of Bangladesh and the virtual non-existence of an industrial bourgeoisie there.

### III The Economic Roots of the Social Crisis.

It is within the context of this analysis that we can understand the inability of the National bourgeoisie in South Asia to sustain an economic growth of sufficient magnitude and of the right quality to solve even the basic economic and social problems of the vast masses of these countries. In India today, after 3 decades of 'economic development' and four Five-year Plans, it is estimated that 40% of the rural population and 50% of the urban population are living below the poverty line -(according the official definition of 'desirable minimum of consumption' this means Rs. 20 per capita per month or about 15 Dollars per annum.) 2. And these proportions are

not expected to change substantially in the next decade. In fact the conditions of the lowest decile in the population, it is anticipated, will decline still further and in absolute terms those below the minimum level of consumption will be much higher. According to the Planning Commission of India, at the present level of development, it would take 30 to 50 years for the poorer section of the people to reach minimum level of consumption. <sup>3</sup>

Nor has India managed to eliminate periodical famines and shortages of food grain and that despite substantial grants and loans to the agricultural sector, which is more often than not means the Landlords and the rich peasants. Inspite of the much publicised Green revolution food grain production continues to fall short of the country's needs. Periodic droughts, speculative hoardings by grain merchants, inflation etc causes sharp fluctuations in food grain prices accompanied by upward movement of the prices. For instance, between 1960 and 1968 the average price of rice rose by almost 100%. <sup>4</sup> Thus despite very optimistic forecasts on grain production for 1972/73 the drought has created severe shortages of food grain and India has been forced to import substantial supplies this year.

The best indication of the deep going malaise of the Indian economy could be grasped the moment one examines the problem of unemployment and under-employment. Estimates of the number of the unemployed vary, some of them as high as a hundred million. Recently the Finance Minister of India announced in the India Parliament that for 50 vacancies for clerks in a New Delhi Office there were 22,000 applications. Under-employment is equally large, particularly in the rural areas. According to official estimates a male agricultural worker can find work only for 190 days per year and a female worker only 120 days. <sup>5</sup> Employment opportunities grow at the rate of 2% per annum while the population increases by 2.5% per year. A new layer of Indians are joining the ranks of the unemployed - i.e. the educated unemployed. It is estimated that 10% of the Graduates and 15% of matriculants, at any given point of time are unemployed. <sup>6</sup>

In rural India, where more than 70% of the population live, most of the unemployed and the under-employed are landless rural poor. The converse of that is the enormous concentration of land amongst a small section of the population. In 1960/61 about 12% of the rural households owned 61% of the land. <sup>7</sup> More recent studies confirm that this monopolistic grip on land has remained unchanged. <sup>8</sup> Although various legislative measures designed to initiate land reform have somewhat reduced the holdings of very big absentee landlords, <sup>9</sup> they have not only been ineffective but mere paper reforms as far as the mass of landless and poor peasants were concerned; the latter who had to confront the economic and political power of the Landlords and the rich peasants, often backed by the goondas <sup>10</sup> and the police, could not enforce these paper reforms. These landlords have continued to extract high rents - quite often as high as 60 to 65 per cent of the produce - from the tenant farmer. The miserable living conditions of the rural poor, whose oppression is varied and considerable - landlessness, rural indebtedness, caste oppression, malnutrition etc - is unlikely to change in the near future as long as the present social system subsists.



The discrimination of scheduled castes and tribes continues unabated despite the claims of the Indian government to the contrary. Equal opportunities in jobs, housing and education has proved illusory. Often the most oppressed rural poor and the agricultural proletariat belongs to the scheduled castes and tribes and their oppressors are the high caste landlords. Even today educational opportunities are monopolised by the Brahmins and the 'middle castes' who have registered significant progress, while the scheduled castes and tribes continue to lag behind despite various 'special measures' to provide incentives to the latter. Literacy is crawling at snail's pace amongst another section of the oppressed - the women. It is no accident that even today 70% of the Indian masses - i.e. about 350 million people - remain illiterate while in neighbouring China illiteracy has almost disappeared. All these factors only demonstrate the utter bankruptcy of the National bourgeoisie of these countries, because what is stated above in relation to the Indian bourgeoisie is more or less true for the other countries - Pakistan, Bangladesh and Ceylon.

#### IV The Impact of the Green Revolution.

In the recent past much fanfare has been made of the Green revolution; until the recent famine in India many government officials and even some Western Academics considered that the Green revolution had resolved the problems of periodic famines caused by droughts and poor harvests. The term Green revolution generally refers to the substantial increase in the <sup>11</sup> output of food grains, particularly wheat, as a result of changes introduced in the Agricultural sector by the application of new inputs and techniques - e.g. high yielding varieties of seed, chemical fertilizer, use of tractors, irrigation etc. 12-14. This solution was first demonstrated in India under the "Intensive Agricultural development programme" initiated by the Ford Foundation in 1961. It was followed by the "High Yielding Varieties programme" in 1965, which extended the use of these techniques to large parts of India. The latter was a programme sponsored by the Government of India. At about the same time these techniques were also adopted in Pakistan, again with the assistance and the encouragement of the Pakistani government.

The Green revolution has its genesis in the need of the industrial bourgeoisie to rapidly expand the output of the food grains in order to remove the agrarian block upon expansion. To recapitulate -- this is to ensure a sufficient flow of agricultural inputs into urban industry in return for the purchase of industrial goods. Needless to say the Green revolution was also greatly encouraged by imperialist capital because it provided, amongst other things, good business opportunities. "When India embarked on its agricultural programme, the U.S. official agencies and private companies came forward with assistance for, or investments in fertilizer plants (i.e. Coromandel, Madras, Trombray) and U.S. companies such as International Harvester and Caterpillar are helping to produce the agricultural equipment needed to modernize farming" <sup>15</sup>. Additionally the South Asian

ruling classes are acutely aware of the correlation existing between the food grain supply and food prices and the degree of social and political stability. This is also a key motivation for imperialism. The story of Green revolution "is woven into the fabric of American foreign policy and is an integral part of the post-war efforts to contain social revolution and make the world safe for profits" 16. However, the main beneficiaries of these technical advances have been the Landlords, rich peasants and the grain merchants. Neither the poor peasant nor the share-cropper has sufficient funds to construct tube-wells, purchase chemical fertilizer nor acquire tractors etc. Apart from their own substantial funds the Landlords and the rich peasants can obtain from Banks and other credit institutions loans necessary for their investment needs. Often they have close links with the urban bourgeoisie from whom they could obtain funds. Rich peasants also tend to dominate rural Co-operatives and thereby ensure that they make the best use of government funds channelled into these institutions. Since the Banks and other credit institutions often assess the repayment capacity of a borrower on the basis of land-ownership, the poor peasant and the share-cropper is very rarely able to obtain credit facilities necessary to finance construction of tube-wells, purchase of tractors etc. In Pakistan the conditions were even more favourable to the rich peasants and the land-holders. In addition to the various government subsidies by way of cheap fertilizer, water supplies etc (thus from 1960 to '65 the government of Pakistan granted 50% subsidy to purchasers of fertilizer), the Pakistani Landlords benefited from very favourable credit facilities provided by the government controlled credit institutions; for instance, loans could be obtained from the Agricultural Development Bank in order to purchase Agricultural machinery and the rate of interest they charged was only 6% per annum whereas the normal rate of interest was about 3 times this figure.

In addition the rich peasants and the landlords also benefited from various other infra structure expenditure financed by the state -- e.g. crop protection measures such as aerial spraying, construction of major irrigation works etc -- by enabling them to adopt more intensive methods of cultivation, widening the markets and reducing labor costs. The adoption of new techniques of production has begun to affect the demand for labour in the rural economy of both India and Pakistan.

Thus the use of tractors, construction of tube-wells etc reduces the demand for labour. As a general rule there is full employment only during the harvesting season. The Green revolution has also adversely affected the small peasant and the share-cropper. Since the share-cropper is a tenant at will, he is never sure of his tenancy. Where the landlord successfully adopts new techniques of cultivation, he will be unwilling to lease out his land to the share-cropper any more; the landlord could now obtain a higher return than the value of rent he receives from the share-cropper. In some areas powerful landlords have even grabbed the land that legally belongs to the small peasants 17. The small peasant and the share cropper is also affected by rising land rents and the high cost of production. Thus in the rural areas of both India and Pakistan conditions are being created for the pauperisation of the

small peasant and the share-cropper. The main obstacle to the acceleration of this process in India today is the existing political structure, although the state apparatus of the Indian bourgeoisie has so far successfully adapted itself to deal with any crisis brought about by the changes in the rural society. Until the establishment of Bangladesh, the West Pakistani bourgeoisie was able to minimise the effects of this crisis; but in the near future the Pakistani bourgeoisie will be faced with the problem of polarisation of class forces and the sharpening of the class struggle in the rural areas thus creating a situation similar to that of India. In neither country is there an expanding industrial sector which can absorb the pauperised rural poor. The 'new' occupations that arise as a result of the Green revolution are not open to the rural poor; since such jobs require a certain amount of education and training, the principal gainers are again the rich and the middle peasant layers of the rural society. In any event the number of such jobs are extremely small.

The impact of Green revolution could therefore be summarised as follows: whilst the Green Revolution has not spread to all parts of India and Pakistan and its affects has not been uniform, it has set in motion a process which on the one hand has led to a significant expansion in the forces of production and increased the volume of agricultural produce, and on the other hand tended to pauperise the small peasant and the share-cropper, and augment the number of the rural unemployed. This process has contributed to a further polarisation of class forces in the countryside. Despite the paltry palliatives that are being offered by the ruling Congress government of India by way of token land reforms and the pre-election demagoguery of Bhutto in Pakistan, this trend of increasing polarisation and the intensification of class struggle is bound to continue; this in turn would lead to frequent confrontation between the rural proletariat and the rural poor on the one side and the rich peasants, the landlords backed by their goondas<sup>18</sup>, local police, local magistrates etc on the other. These confrontations could become not only more frequent and more prolonged but also occur in a number of areas simultaneously. In such a situation the armed bodies of the central government will intervene on the side of the landlords. This is the lesson of the peasant struggles of Srikakulam.

In order to put the above developments in perspective two qualifications have to be made. Firstly, the Green revolution is not a universal phenomena and it is by no means going to lead to an agricultural revolution engulfing the whole sub-continent and having the same effects the Enclosure movement had in Europe; such a course of action would be too risky for the bourgeoisie since it would release social forces that would threaten the whole system. Secondly, the large profits that are made by the adoption of these new techniques of production are not always ploughed back for further modernisation or for the extension of the area under modernisation. Nor are they invested in setting up industries in rural areas. Often such funds are diverted for the purpose of purchasing articles of conspicuous consumption or for other pre-capitalist forms of exploitation such as moneylending.



These qualifications, however, do not affect the main conclusions that revolutionary marxists have to draw from the above facts. The strategy of revolutionaries in the sub-continent must be based not only on an accurate assessment of the objective dynamics of class struggle in the rural areas -- where more than 70% of the population live -- but also on the basis of the historical experiences of past struggles. In this regard it is important to emphasise the following points :

(a) the introduction of capitalist methods of organisation and modern technology into agriculture is beginning to weaken the traditional hold of the rural elite on the rural masses. This in turn creates a more favourable climate for not only the politicisation of the rural masses -- i.e. to break them from the ideology of the ruling classes -- but also to forge more effective and meaningful unity between the urban and the rural proletariat. The general strike of the urban and rural workers which was organised recently by the Lal Nishan party in Maharashtra is an indication of the potential for the future. These changes also explain the new populism of the bourgeoisie -- Garibi Hatao of the Congress. Despite the rhetoric of the bourgeoisie, they are not able to match their words with deeds in their claim to launch war against poverty. Hence the need for selective repression of political movements and revolutionary militants as in the case of Srikakulam, the worker's movement of Tamil Nad etc.

(b) No revolutionary could ignore the strategic importance of the rural poor in the struggle for conquest of power. This, however, does not mean that the leading role of the urban proletariat is no longer valid nor that the revolution will necessarily begin in the countryside. (Schemas that consider that the revolution will be launched only by the urban workers in the Cities is equally erroneous.) The urban proletariat, of course, have the advantage of longer traditions of organisation, greater cohesion and the ability to strike lightning blows. Having said that we must guard against certain myths and erroneous generalisations of the 'Anglo-Saxon' variety of marxists; the latter use the term peasantry to describe all the rural masses who cannot be categorised as the rural proletariat. This is an a priori and an abstract schema based on the analysis of the European and Russian peasantry. The social stratification in South Asia gives a different picture; seasonal workers, landless poor and the share-croppers cannot be considered peasantry in the classical sense. They are not a part of the petty bourgeoisie nor are they lumpen proletariat. These pauperised poor do not emigrate to the Cities (unlike in Britain after the Enclosure movement) because there are no industries that could absorb them. Only a small proportion of them manage to emigrate to the Cities and find employment. The degree of cohesion amongst the rural poor should also not be underestimated; in the village, which is still the primary socio-economic unit in the rural areas, the caste assemblies and organisations, for instance, facilitate such cohesion. Since all inhabitants of a village generally belongs to the same caste, these caste assemblies of the oppressed could become initial centres of class struggle.

(c) Any revolutionary organisation which intends to win the hegemony of the oppressed rural poor would have to answer the problem of how these masses could counter the daily violence that is directed against them by their oppressors.

(d) Finally, it is clear that the traditional demands of land to the tiller as the sole demand of the rural masses is not in itself sufficient today and in some instance it is clearly wrong; for instance in the Tea plantations of Nilgiri or highly mechanised Farms, the demand of land to the tiller is obviously retrogressive. Since unemployment is one of the key problems facing the rural masses the demand for a programme of rural industrialisation would become equally important. Cancellation of the rural debt of the poor peasants is yet another demand that must be incorporated into the programme of the revolutionaries.

#### IV Economic Planning and Growth.

In both India and Pakistan there has been quite a significant growth in productive forces in the industrial sector.<sup>19</sup> A large number of modern industries such as Cement, Chemicals, Fertilizer, and machine tools etc have been set up. In India, in addition, there has been a rapid growth of certain basic industries such as Electricity, Steel, Petroleum and the manufacture of Automobiles, Refrigerators etc. However, the industrial sector in these countries is still very small. With the growth of these high-technology industries the productivity of urban industrial labour has increased considerably.<sup>20</sup> While urban employment has certainly increased over the last few years it has neither been consistent nor dramatic.<sup>21</sup> That is why the urban working class still remains small in comparison to the rural poor etc; they are 22 concentrated in a few Cities. The urban population as a whole amounts to about 20% in India and 24% in Pakistan. The manufacturing sector accounts for 6 - 8% of the National income of India and 10% of the National income of Pakistan. In both countries commercial crops such as Jute, Tea and Cotton still remain the main exports.

This industrial expansion has been sustained to a certain extent by a growth in agriculture — the importance of the overall volume of agricultural output is clear from the way industry tend to be markedly affected by the size of the harvests and the variability of the monsoons. The record harvest of 1953-54, due to excellent weather conditions, helped to expand the industrial market for textiles and other industrial goods. In the first years of the Indian Second Plan there was a low rate of industrial expansion and relative stagnation in agriculture. This in turn was followed by the good harvests of 1958-59 again accompanied by rapid industrial growth. Thereafter in the early '60s the situation was slightly modified with poorer harvest going together with industrial expansion. The reason for this change in the general pattern was basically the massive step up of state expenditure in the Second and the Third plans. By the mid 60's the pace of the Indian governments efforts could not be sustained and this, together with the effects of two catastrophic harvests sent industry into a deep recession. Having made this point it should be emphasised that agriculture is in no way a leading sector — while good harvests may pull up the rate of growth it is in general industry that is pulling agriculture along as a weight behind it. The overall trend of the agricultural demand for industry and the supply from agriculture has not been good. In India over the

period 1951/52 to 1965/66 the yearly rate of growth of the net marketed surplus of agriculture was 2.90% and that of agricultural production 2.70%. It has been above all due to the state initiative in the successive Five Year Plans that there has been a substantial increase in private industrial investments. Expansion of state expenditure <sup>23</sup> and the increase in the demand for industrial products in the public sector has created favourable conditions for large scale industrial investments in the private sector <sup>24</sup>. Public sector investments though small have played an important role in developing basic industries such as Petroleum and Steel. Generally the private investor has been reluctant to undertake long term investments involving large capital expenditure of this nature. In India the state has also created new Financial institutions such as the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India, purpose of which is to provide public funds to facilitate the growth of the private sector. Similarly the funds of the Nationalised Insurance and Banking institutions have also placed increasingly large sums of capital at the disposal of the private sector. In the recent past this form of financing has been particularly important since private corporate savings seems to have levelled off. The state has also taken other measures such as subsidies, tariffs and quota restrictions, joint sector ventures <sup>25</sup> etc to stimulate private industrial investments.

After all the rhetoric about taking over the 'commanding heights of the economy' the Congress government of India has now opted for the joint-sector approach; this often takes the form of providing substantial financial support, by public Financial institutions, to large private companies by way of loans or purchase of equity shares in these companies. The Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry has referred to the joint-sector investments as a 'welcome innovation' in the context of the need for economic growth and the social and political environment prevailing in the country.

The role of the state in facilitating private investments is therefore not subsidiary or marginal. And this is not confined to India. In Pakistan too the state has provided extensive 'tax holidays' -- as much as 60% Of the total profits of any one year if the investments is in any one of the approved sectors --, generous depreciation allowances, massive direct and indirect subsidies, loans at very low rates of interest etc to facilitate private capital formation.

State economic planning has also reinforced the trend towards cartelisation in both India and Pakistan. In both countries most of the industries and businesses are controlled by a few large monopolies, most of which are family owned business houses. The degree of industrial concentration in both India and Pakistan seems to be much higher than that of the advanced capitalist countries. According to the Monopolies Commission Inquiry of India in 1964, 75 business houses accounted for 46.9% of the total assets and 44.1% of the total paid up capital of all non-government and non-banking companies <sup>26</sup>. And as for product concentration, of 1131 ( or 87.14% of the total ) products 75% of the share of the output was controlled by the top three enterprises. A large number of industries seems to thrive on an output well below their full capacity, with high



prices and high profits. Even though capacity utilisation has remained low and the rate of growth of the industrial output has been declining in the recent past, established business houses have reaped consistently high profits. In a recent study of 290 non-Financial and non-government companies (with a paid up capital of Rs. 1000 million or more) it is shown that profit after tax has risen from 132 thousand million Rupees in 1965/66 to Rs. 211 thousand millions in 1970/71. Over the same period the retained profits went up from Rs. 52,000 millions to Rs. 97,000 millions. <sup>27</sup> The under-utilisation of productive capacity is by no means due to lack of resources; the fact that there is no dearth of funds flowing into non-manufacturing spheres of economic activity such as commodity speculation, real property purchases and money lending indicates this.

Similarly in Pakistan, by 1968 the Monopolies had concentrated in their hands the ownership of 66% of the industrial assets, 80% of the commercial Banks and 70% Of the Insurance companies. In fact, the Fourth Five year plan admitted this ..... "concentration is leading to pre-emption of new (investment and foreign exchange) sanctions and bank credits by big industrial families, resulting in a denial of opportunities to the late-comers" <sup>28</sup>. The American adviser G.F. Paponek has stated that the concentration of wealth in the hands of these 'Robber Barons' ensured them annual profits (in industry) which was higher than 100% <sup>29</sup>. In Pakistan too, this cartelisation has given rise to the under-utilisation of industrial capacity. An OECD study estimates the extent of this under-utilisation to be as high as 30%.

These state efforts to sustain private industrial capital accumulation, that have been discussed, have leant very heavily on resources obtained from abroad. Inability to raise taxes from the agricultural sector has made the financing of public sector growth programmes difficult. The state has had to rely increasingly on indirect taxes and deficit financing which, through rising prices, adversely affected the workers and poor peasants. But such methods can only be carried so far -- and borrowing from imperialist countries has become an important and indispensable method of obtaining resources. Such borrowing is made doubly necessary due to the foreign exchange gaps which the South Asian economies are running. These foreign exchange gaps are ultimately rooted in the unbalanced and lopsided industrial and economic structures bequeathed by centuries of colonial domination; given such industrial and economic structures efforts to industrialise involve large imports of producer goods. To pay for these, attempts are made to push more primary products like tea, jute etc into a stagnant world market. Since these commodities are often being sold in competition with the products of other ex-colonial countries which are similarly trying to industrialise, they are often sold at declining prices on the world market.

Examining the magnitude of foreign aid in Pakistan and India in turn we find that Pakistan in 1969 had received a total of 6033 million Dollars in foreign aid; only 7% of this came from countries

outside the Western capitalist bloc. This has been indispensable in financing Pakistan's recurring balance of payments deficit. During the 3rd Plan foreign aid amounted to 66% of the value of total imports of Pakistan. This increasing dependence on foreign aid has naturally increased the burden of debt servicing. Official estimates show that the cost of servicing the foreign debt, which accounted for 3.6% of Pakistan's current Account earnings in 1960/61 rose to 19.2% in 1969/70<sup>31</sup>. The story is much the same for India; foreign aid utilised by India in 1969/70 amounted to 3% of the National Income, 20% of the national investments and over 50% of the annual imports.<sup>32</sup> Despite the much publicised rhetoric of Mrs Gandhi about 'self reliance' the Indian economy is likely to become more and not less dependent on foreign aid. In the period 1966/67 to 1970/71 the cost of servicing the debt amounted to 370 million Rupees, which represents about 30% of India's export earnings. This increasing dependence of both India and Pakistan on foreign aid gives the imperialist powers an important lever with which they could put pressure on these governments, particularly to force these regimes to orient their economies to suit the needs of imperialism; thus they persuade these regimes to permit foreign capital participation in local firms and to extend licences to foreign companies etc. These measures in turn increase their economic dependence on the aid donor countries of the West, since technology, Capital goods and the know-how employed by these foreign companies have to be imported from the West. The increase in the scope and the influence of foreign private capital in the corporate sector of the South Asian economies can be seen, then, to be partly a result of the declining manoeuvrability of the South Asian states vis-a-vis their Western creditors. The attitude of indigenous private capital to increasing imperialist dominance in the industrialisation process has changed over time. Initially the Indian bourgeoisie was hostile to private foreign capital - this reflected its experience of discrimination and exclusion from the closely knit community of interests between the colonial state and the colonial Financial, commercial and industrial establishment prior to Independence. After a time, however, Indian industrial capital began to welcome collaboration agreements and joint-ventures with imperialist capital; such collaboration gave indigenous firms powerful allies in their struggle with indigenous rivals and they provided foreign exchange, know-how and other vital inputs that allowed them to expand. Furthermore they served as an important counter-weight to the rural elite.

Although the quantum of foreign owned capital as a proportion of the total domestic economy is still quite small, its grip on certain important branches of the economy is quite strong. In the large scale industries of Pakistan, the foreign exchange investors owned 40% of the shares in all major limited companies (that is of all limited companies quoted in the Karachi stock exchange).<sup>33</sup> In India foreign capital accounts for nearly 50% of all capital in Mining, Plantations, Banking and large scale industrial concerns. Foreign capital occupies an important place in the principal foreign

exchange earning industries such as jute, cotton and tea as well as fuel and power industries such as Petroleum, coal and electricity. Since the Independence the trend has been increasingly to reorient to the newer expanding industries catering for the domestic market.

Most of the foreign firms which have invested in India are subsidiaries of British and American monopolies. As we have seen the internal contradictions of the Indian and Pakistani development programme compelled these two states to rely heavily on foreign aid and hence to liberalize the scope of foreign private capital. A by-product of foreign investments and collaboration has been a distortion in the pattern of economic development in these countries. The foreign companies prefer to utilise their own imported equipment and technologies in India, Pakistan etc and as they are already operating in foreign markets through different subsidiaries or branches, they are unwilling to export the products which they assemble in South Asia. It goes without saying that the foreign companies also remit large amounts in interest, dividends and royalties to their mother countries. This further increases the foreign exchange outflow. The net effect of all this is that the foreign private sector is a user rather than a contributor of foreign exchange. The economic dependence of the South Asian economies is thus continually reinforced by the presence of foreign capital. Additionally one finds that foreign technology, adopted and utilized by the foreign companies and or their collaborators is neither suited to the size of the markets in South Asia nor to the conditions of massive availability of cheap labor power. The first factor means that equipment is often under-utilized due to low level of production runs. The second factor is very important indeed because it means that the rapidly growing labour force cannot be absorbed in industry and unemployment and under-employment inevitably rise. The limited growth in employment means an increasingly desperate position for the poorer strata of the population. For those at work competition for jobs keeps wages low and stagnant even though output and productivity are growing. It is the capitalist class (and to a limited extent a privileged layer of the petty-bourgeoisie) that, in this context, win the benefits of economic growth. It is needless to say that there is a growing polarisation of wealth and income.

Thus we find that the industrial development of India and Pakistan has neither improved the living conditions of the working class nor substantially increased employment opportunities for the mass of unemployed. The average real wage of an industrial worker in India is below 200 Rupees a month<sup>34</sup> and it has remained almost constant for nearly three decades - 1939 - 1969. In Pakistan the real wages of urban workers actually declined between 1955 and 1964. While industrial employment has been rising rapidly. Thus between 1954/55 and 1962/63 productivity per worker, in Pakistan rose at an annual rate of 15.8%<sup>35</sup>; between 1961 and 1962 industrial production rose by 70%, productivity by 35%, while the number of factory workers rose only by 16%.<sup>36</sup> In India the average



real productivity per worker went up by 63% while the growth in employment was less than 3% per annum. It has taken two decades of planning for the Planning Commission to admit that economic growth has not automatically led to a rise in employment or standard of living of the vast mass of people.

Industrial production, in both India and Pakistan, has not only been dominated by big monopolies, but a substantial proportion of it has been oriented to the needs of a small minority of the population. A number of non-essential and luxury industries, which almost wholly caters to the needs of the upper strata of the society (which makes up less than 1.5% of the population in India) has grown up. These industries – e.g. manufacture of air conditioning equipment, Refrigerators etc -- have been established not because of some accident or mismanagement of the economy but because it is in these sectors that the capitalists find adequate demand and large but quick profits. For instance in 1966/67 the top 10% of the urban population consumed as much as 37% of the total supply of industrial goods. The industrial structure is, in general, geared to the needs of this sector of the population. It is ironic that various 'rural work programmes' etc all work in the same direction – i.e. to enrich the wealth owning minority at the expense of the toilers both urban and rural. Therefore the pious claims about socialist development notwithstanding the economic planning, in both India and Pakistan for over two decades, has only helped to consolidate the monopolistic grip of the national and foreign bourgeoisie.

## VI Political Repression.

Throughout the Indian sub-continent, the urban and rural masses have always suffered violence at the hand of their ruling classes in a manner rarely experienced by the European working class. In particular, the lowest strata of the rural society have been subjected to the most brutal form of harassment <sup>37</sup>. The attack on Kilvemani (in East Thanjavur) in 1968 <sup>38</sup> and the Pahlwedi incident which occurred in Maharashtra in May 1972 <sup>39</sup> are just two examples of such violence. Repressive violence is, of course, not confined to rural areas. The brutal and indiscriminate attack on the Dalit Panthers on the 5th and 6th of January this year by the police in Bombay and the series of incidents that occurred recently in the Tamil Nad – from those concerning the strike at the Simpson Factory in 1972 to the violent attacks on workers of Ashok Leyland in 1973 -- demonstrate the response of the bourgeoisie and their forces of 'law and order' to the efforts of the workers and other oppressed layers trying to exercise even the most elementary democratic rights. Similar incidents have taken place in other Cities and villages throughout the sub-continent.

In the recent past, however, this form of 'social control' has

proved to be inadequate particularly in the face of determined resistance by the oppressed masses. This on the one hand, is due to the quantitative growth of already existing problems such as high unemployment, dispossession of the rural poor etc and the inability of the ruling class to give any significant concessions to the masses; and on the other hand due to the contradictions within the ruling alliances in these countries — as already indicated — have begun to weaken the traditional hold of the rural elite on the rural masses. These developments have made it increasingly difficult for the indigenous bourgeoisie to maintain the facade of bourgeois democracy in these countries. Where mass struggles develop or threaten to develop beyond the confines of one factory or one locality — as it happened in West Bengal in 1971/72 and in Bangladesh in the same period — and take region-wide dimensions, the repressive machinery of the Central state apparatus is deployed swiftly and efficiently to either suppress or contain such mass movements or to eliminate vanguard layers before such movements develop.

Thus in Ceylon as well in West Bengal the repressive forces of the state succeeded in quickly de-fusing potentially dangerous situations. But in Bangladesh the repression only produced a more determined response from the masses. In the latter case a combination of exceptional circumstances prevented the West Pakistani army from either containing or crushing the Bangladesh liberation movement swiftly. But such exceptionally favourable situations are unlikely to recur too often. That is why it is necessary to draw the lessons from the experiences in Ceylon and West Bengal.

In West Bengal the Indian bourgeois state not only managed to destroy the Naxalite movement — by systematic liquidation of literally hundreds of militants and throwing into jail and detention thousands more — but also succeeded in crippling the CPI(M) machine. By judicious use of the goondas of the Chattar Parishad on the one hand and the Central Reserve Police on the other, the Indian bourgeoisie managed to, at least temporarily, stabilise the explosive situation that existed in West Bengal. The timing of this operation — when chauvinist hysteria over the intervention of the Indian army in Bangladesh — and the finesse with which it was carried out demonstrate the effectiveness of the repressive apparatus of the Indian ruling class. No doubt the CPI(M) by tail-ending the bourgeoisie on Bangladesh and by instigating state violence against the Naxalites facilitated the repression. Nevertheless, revolutionary marxists must recognise the fact that the Indian bourgeoisie have managed to streamline their repressive machine and its destruction cannot be achieved by small adventurist actions or by spontaniest risings of the masses.

Similarly the bloody repression initiated by the Ceylonese bourgeoisie

regime in April 1971 was a well planned though clumsily executed 40 operation designed to stem the rising tide of working class unrest, create the necessary pre-conditions for for implementing severe austerity measures demanded of the Bandaranaike regime by the World Bank and to nip in the bud the emergence of a potentially dangerous revolutionary vanguard. While the Ceylonese bourgeoisie certainly miscalculated the enormity of the task involved and the adverse repercussions of their actions, in one sense they were more astute than their counterparts in India and Pakistan, because before they carried out this operation they managed to divide and disorganise the working class movement by winning over section of the reformist working class leaders to their camp. From this point of view, the repression would have more lasting effects because it would take a much longer time, than for instance in West Bengal, for the working class movement to recover from the effects of repression.

What conclusions should revolutionaries draw from these developments ? Today the bourgeois state apparatuses in the Indian sub-continent have been streamlined to deal with revolutionary movements before they manage to develop substantial links with the masses. It would therefore be naive to to think that revolutionaries could build a mass revolutionary party without seeking to answer the problems posed by these developments — i.e. the problem of how to counter the daily violence of Landlords and capitalists; how to organise self-defence of the masses in struggle and, above all, how to respond to the intervention of the army to crush a mass movement which threatens to engulf a whole region or the whole country but which at the point of intervention of the army exists only in one particular area.

## VII The National Question.

The struggle for Bangladesh demonstrated both the importance of the National question in the sub-continent as well as the disastrous consequences that follow in situations where the Left fail to grasp its anti-capitalist dynamic. The 'National Independence' granted to the former British colonies did not help to resolve the problem of nationalities in the Indian sub-continent. In fact the manner in which British imperialism sought to transfer political power to their local allies, the national bourgeoisie — which led to the partition of India on religious lines — exacerbated the National problems because it led to the division of National groups on the one hand and the lumping together of several nationalities on the other. Since the Independence, economic stagnation with the inevitable consequences of unemployment, deterioration of living conditions etc has intensified social tension; and periodically the question of nationalities have come to the fore.



The nature of the problem of nationalities in the sub-continent, is somewhat different from that of Czarist Russia or the Austro-Hungarian Empire, because in the latter cases there were identifiable oppressor nationalities. A similar situation perhaps, may said to have existed in Pakistan before the liberation of Bangladesh; even here it is difficult to speak about the West Pakistan oppressor nation because West Pakistan was made up of a number of nationalities — e.g. Pathans, Baluchs, Punjabis etc. In Ceylon the Sinhalas are certainly the oppressor nation and the Tamils the oppressed. But in India today, it is difficult to speak about an oppressor nation. Neither the Urdu speaking people of Pakistan nor the Hindi speaking people in India — who certainly do not constitute the numerical majority — can be considered oppressor nations.

Due to the failure of the National bourgeoisie of these countries to overcome local and regional interests, unify the agrarian market and carry through a thoroughgoing programme of industrialisation, centrifugal and separatist tendencies amongst various national groups have been reinforced. The immediate causes that bring to the fore such national and separatist movements are many and varied. In Tamil Nad, the D.K. and even the D.M.K. arose as a secular movement against the Hindu-Brahmin domination; in Telengana it was high unemployment; in Maharashtra it was the influx of South Indian workers and in Kashmir it was the desire of to overcome the division of a people with deep historical roots.

In most cases the leadership of these movements have been maintained securely in the hands of smaller regional capitalists and the petty-bourgeoisie — and these social layers have exploited these movements to their own economic, social and political advantage. Of course, capitalist growth is extremely uneven — both sectorally and geographically — as expansion creates 'external economies' and acquire its own momentum tending to attract resources out of the 'declining' or 'backward' and thereby creating further 'external diseconomies'. But this spontaneous tendency has been deliberately accentuated in South Asia. Where jobs, foreign excahnge, taxation resources and lucarative government contracts are all in short supply one area or region can get more of these if other areas get less. This, of course, is the most spectacular in West Pakistan and what is now Bangaladesh. But it has happened elsewhere in the sub-continent. In India for example the more backward region of Telengana when united into Andhra Pradesh has been exploited in a similar manner. Of the agitation that broke out against this in Telengana in 1969, one commentator writes "all are agreed that Telengana has been cheated of several crores of rupees each year. such a position adds fuel to the separatist's contention that Telengana would have

progressed faster in isolation from Andhra Pradesh. Imbalance in economic development is surely the greatest single cause."\*

By mobilising on linguistic, cultural and other such differences the regional and smaller capitalist groups hope to either sustain their position at the expense of other areas or to prevent themselves being pulled into 'sub-colonial' situations. Smaller capital and the rural elite are also able to use the states in the Federal structure of India, to their own advantage. As has already been explained the states are loath to raising their own taxation resources; they are not, however, loath to over-spending money and then going to Federal government to finance their budgetary deficits.

The regional and national movements have other uses for the local bourgeoisie. For example the D.M.K. in Tamil Nad used the nationalist sentiments of the Dravidians to promote a long period of class peace and class collaboration; it was also useful as a bargaining counter in the inter-bourgeois struggle. The well timed intervention of Indian forces in Bangladesh was not the least due to the desire of the Indian bourgeoisie to avert the possible eruption of an all Bengali struggle for a united Bengal. It is, however, necessary to stress that these movements have a contradictory character — both reactionary and progressive. They are reactionary in so far as they develop within a framework of a multi-class alliance, and are normally dominated by the bourgeoisie and its ideology. By hegemonising these movements the bourgeoisie has been able to promote class peace and divert the attention of the masses away from the immediate oppressor and focus it on some 'external enemy'; D.M.K. pursued this policy for nearly two decades. However, these movements also have and anti-capitalist and therefore a progressive character due to the specific circumstances in which they develop — as one of the unfinished tasks of the bourgeois revolution they threaten to break up the political 'solution' imposed on the sub-continent by imperialism. Therefore these movements could serve as the starting point of an anti-capitalist struggle that culminates in the socialist revolution.

Where such movements develop the revolutionaries should neither tail end them nor stand on the sidelines. The former would be an opportunist policy that would reinforce the grip of the bourgeoisie and the latter would be a sectarian policy that would prevent the revolutionaries from wrenching the leadership of these movements from the hands of the bourgeoisie. The task of the revolutionary socialists is to intervene in these movements with the perspective of fighting for an anti-capitalist perspective and a revolutionary programme within these movements; to constantly emphasise the limitations of bourgeois nationalism and tirelessly expose the role

of the bourgeois leadership of these movements. The failure of the 'left' in both India and Pakistan to pursue such a course has left the bourgeoisie in control of these movements. Their impotence was demonstrated during the Bangladesh struggle — whilst the Naxalites failed to grasp the significance of the potential of this struggle and clung on to the pro-Pakistan policy of the 'New Mandarins' of Peking, the CPI and the CPI(M) both succumbed to Indian chauvinism. In the case of the CPI it was understandable since it is tied to the Kremlin bureaucracy. But the CPI(M), which only a few weeks before the outbreak of the struggle for Bangladesh had claimed that both Indhira Gandhi and Yahya Khan were the same and that they were both fascists, meekly capitulated to the chauvinist hysteria generated by the Indian bourgeoisie. In Ceylon the failure of the J.V.P. to understand the oppression of the Tamil minorities and their inability to project any solutions to their problems isolated them from the Tamil masses of the North.

Where the National movements emerge whether it is in Tamil Nad , Baluchistan, Bengal or Kashmir, it would be equally incorrect to counterpose to such movements abstract slogans such as 'for a united socialist Republic of the Indian sub-continent' because they mechanically counterpose the goal of tomorrow to the concrete struggle of today without showing the way forward for such struggles to be utilised to reach the goal of tomorrow. It could also be used, and is often used, as a fig leaf to cover up the capitulation to the dominant bourgeois forces.

## VIII Role of the Left parties.

### (a) India.

In the Indian sub-continent numerically the most important parties have been the Stalinist and the Maoist parties, and without exception all these parties have been trapped in an impasse created by their own political theory and practice. They have been incapable of providing a way forward to the masses despite the explosive social crises of these countries. In this sense it can be said that the bourgeoisie and their allies have maintained themselves in power by default. Elsewhere in this journal there is a detailed critique of the CPI and the CPI(M). 41 Therefore here it is sufficient to say that both these parties, by their shady alliances with reactionary bourgeois parties, by subordination of mass struggles to their opportunist electoral ends and by their reformist theories about 'peaceful co-existence' to socialism, they continually misled the masses. Both these parties and their counterparts in other countries constitute obstacles to the socialist revolution.

The electoralist opportunism of the CPI(M) leadership, its differences



with the leadership of the Chinese Communist party (CPC) and the upsurge of mass struggles in West Bengal — particularly the events in Naxalbari — brought about a sharp polarisation within the CPI(M) and eventually to the exodus of a large number of militants from its ranks. Two years later, in April 1969, some of the dissidents who left the CPI(M) formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). Like the CPI(M), the CPI(ML) too had as its main perspective the achievement of the 'Peoples democratic revolution' — i.e. the task of destroying the comprador-bureaucratic capitalism and feudalism, which were considered to be the main props of United States and 'Soviet social imperialism'. Their strategy was to initiate armed struggle in the countryside on the lines of rural guerilla warfare and to isolate the Cities by winning the countryside. Charu Mazumdar, one of the key political leaders of the CPI(ML), supplemented this with his own specific theory of guerilla warfare — i.e. the 'annihilation theory', whereby the communist cadres concentrated on physical elimination of powerful landlords etc.

The Naxalites made no effort to mobilise the peasant masses, to encourage their self activity or to arm them. Isolated from the rural masses they became an easy target for the police who succeeded in hounding them out of the rural areas by early 1970. Thereafter the Naxalites shifted to the Cities and tried to continue these dead-end policies. Despite their suicidal course the CPC continued to support the CPI(ML). The loss of large number of cadre, internal differences and finally the consequences of the CPC's reactionary line of Bangladesh led to the decay and disintegration of the CPI(ML). However, despite the misconceptions and mistakes of the Naxalites it is necessary distinguish them from the CPI and the CPI(M) leaders. Vast majority of the Naxalites were genuine revolutionary cadre who were driven to adventurist political actions by the opportunism of the CPI(M) on the one hand and the cynical manipulations of them by the CPC on the other. A process of re-examination and re-assessment will undoubtedly occur amongst a vast majority of the ex-naxalites. Every effort should be made to assist such a process of political clarification.

Apart from the two communist parties and the Naxalites, there are a large number of regional left groups in India which cannot be discussed in an article of this nature. Most of them are, however, confined to one or two Cities and have little support amongst broad masses. Two important exception to this are the Lal Nishan Party of Maharashtra and the workers movement led by R.Kuchelar in Tamil Nad. The former is an important political organisation with deep roots amongst both the urban and rural workers. Whilst they have broken with most of the stalinist political conceptions they have yet to elaborate a global strategy for the Indian revolution. The movement led by comrade Kuchelar — a dissident communist expelled from the CPI(M)

— in Tamil Nad has succeeded in breaking the grip of D.M.K. on the tamil working class. This movement must be given the credit for ending the class collaborationist period that existed in Tamil Nad for nearly two decades. So far this movement has remained a militant trade union movement and obviously if it continue to remain there it would have very great limitations. These and many other smaller organisations need closer examination because the best elements of these parties must obviously re-grouped in any process of building a Bolshevik party in India.

#### (b) Ceylon

In Ceylon the degeneration and decomposition of the traditional left parties has gone much further than elsewhere in the sub-continent. Both the pro-Moscow Communist party (CPM) and the ex-trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaja party (LSSP) joined the coalition government of Madame Bandaranaike and since then they have been the most vociferous supporters of its anti-working class policies. Since the repression of 1971, the government of Madame Bandaranaike has managed to rule by decree with the aid of the 'Emergency regulations'. This has meant not only the curtailment of all democratic rights but also the introduction of severe austerity measures such as the imposition of a wage freeze, drastic reduction of food subsidies, introduction of large scale rationing etc all designed to impose further burdens on the working class and the rural poor.

These measures have created a serious rift in the ranks of the CPM and a majority of their members of Parliament (4 out of 6) have been expelled from the ranks of the governing coalition while the other two are ministers in Madame Bandaranaike's government. The CPM, however, continue to give critical support to the Bandaranaike regime. Clearly the bourgeoisie have succeeded in effectively destroying the credibility of the traditional left parties and to ensure the fragmentation of the working class movement. These developments have once again demonstrated that alliances with bourgeois parties — i.e. Popular fronts — only lead to disorientation and defeat of the working class. It is an irony of history that in Ceylon it was not only the stalinists who contributed to this tragic experience but also, and principally, the LSSP, a party which called itself trotskyist.

The Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) which emerged in 1970, drew its members primarily from the ranks of the militants who broke with the pro-Peking Communist party (CPP). Its emergence was a historically important development. Despite its limitations — e.g. insufficient theoretical level of the cadre, inability to grasp the problem of minorities, lack of an internationalist perspective and above all the total inability to understand the nature of the Chinese bureaucracy — the JVP was able to demonstrate by their propaganda as well by their actions the futility of the parliamentary road to socialism, bankruptcy of the traditional left and the need for a serious perspective for the conquest of power. The political influence of the JVP, particularly on rural youth, was very much greater than that of the Naxalites. The repression, however,

has virtually destroyed its organisation and it is unlikely that many of its leading cadres would become politically active again, at least in the foreseeable future.

The small group of revolutionaries who broke with the LSSP over its entry into the coalition government – The Revolutionary Marxist party [formerly known as LSSP(revolutionary)] remained isolated for a long time, primarily, because they were swimming against the current. Today they have not only been vindicated but has emerged as the only group that has been able to organise any opposition to the repression as well as to the anti-working class measures enacted by the government. Under the present circumstances they could rapidly re-group the working class and its allies provided they avoid the past errors of the LSSP, the most serious of which was their inability to give any perspective to the rural proletariat and the rural poor.

The pro-Chinese Communist party was thrown into a severe crisis during the repression, and after a prolonged internal struggle it went through a further split. The political denunciation of the JVP by the bureaucrats of Peking made life even more difficult for the small Maoist groups. Today they are numerically and politically insignificant.

#### (c) Pakistan.

The traditions of even an orthodox pro-Moscow brand of 'communism' have been virtually non-existent in Pakistan, particularly in the Western sector of the country. The emergence of Bangladesh has further depleted the ranks of Pakistani 'communism'. However, what did exist represented a pathetic strain of the Communist party of India(CPI). Impatient for power the Communist party of Pakistan(CPP) leaders in 1950 embroiled themselves in an attempted coup together with reactionary generals, were discovered and the party was banned. Since that time in both East and West Pakistan the communists operated via a petty-bourgeois nationalist party, the National Awami party and they accordingly split this party into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking wings after the Sino-Soviet split. The role of both wings was rather inglorious. The pro-Peking NAP supported the Ayub military dictatorship because of latter's 'friendship with China' and the pro-Moscow NAP degenerated into a liberal opposition. Thus during the anti-military upsurge in 1968 both groups were by-passed by Bhutto in the West and Mujibur Rahman in the East. The struggle for Bangladesh threw the Maoists in utter confusion. The support given by the Chinese government to Yahya Khan (for which a leading Chinese military delegation was publicly thanked in Islamabad in January this year by General Tikka Khan, the butcher of Dacca and presently the military boss of the country) resulted in a political eclipse of Maoism in Bangladesh. Even in West Pakistan the effects are now beginning to be felt as Maoism continues on its rightward course. For many militants there is now no qualitative difference between the Soviet and the Chinese policy in the sub-continent. If the Soviets have collaborated with the Indian bourgeoisie, the Chinese have gone even further with the Pakistani ruling class. The extreme left parties that exist are clearly insufficient. While the Mazdoor Kisan party mingles



verses from the Koran with the thoughts of the great helmsman in Peking, the Pakistan Socialist party formalises its break with Peking by looking once again to Moscow. In fact one of the problems not confronted by the left has been to work out a strategy for the Pakistani revolution in relation to the rest of the sub-continent. This has made them insular and chauvinistic, which would be a problem in the best cases, but in a situation where the very existence of Pakistan is at stake does weaken the capacity to win over the vanguard. 44

## IX For a Leninist party and a Leninist International.

In conclusion it is necessary (a) to briefly summarise the main points of the foregoing analysis and (b) to indicate the broad perspectives for revolutionary socialists in the Indian sub-continent.

1. The political and military defeats suffered by world imperialism in general and American imperialism in particular, the re-appearance of sharp inter-imperialist competition and the re-awakening of the working class movement in the Metropolis have led the imperialist countries to re-orient their strategy vis-a-vis the colonial and neo-colonial countries. This strategy has as its aim:

(i) the creation of powerful states such as Iran and Brazil to act as regional policemen;

(ii) continue to strengthen the military and bureaucratic apparatuses of the neo-colonial states and

(iii) to strengthen the internal capitalist forces and assist the growth of productive forces in these countries e.g. Green revolution etc.

2. This new strategy has brought about a new realignment between the bourgeoisie of these countries and imperialism and with it greater participation of foreign capital in the productive process by way of collaboration agreements, joint ventures etc.

3. These developments have certainly assisted the growth of productive forces and the introduction of modern technological processes to the backward sectors of these societies - e.g. agriculture. Nevertheless the main beneficiaries of this 'economic development' has been, by and large, the big monopoly houses. By contrast the conditions of both the urban and rural masses -- in terms of employment, cost of living etc -- have if anything deteriorated.

4. This realignment of the International and the National bourgeoisie and the resulting economic strategy has tended to weaken the traditional authority of the rural elite over the rural masses. Furthermore, it also tends to weaken the traditional alliance between the national bourgeoisie and the rural elite. While these developments have impelled the bourgeoisie to adopt more populist political slogans and platforms -- Garibi Hatao -- with the hope of hegemonising rural masses directly (and not via the rural elite), they are aware of the fact that they can only go so far and not further without risking the outbreak of a permanent revolutionary crisis. Where the traditional social control over the rural masses by the rural elite has broken down or weakened, and where the bourgeoisie have not managed to fill the resulting vacuum, they have had to adopt large scale repressive measures against incipient mass movements of the rural masses. From the point of view of revolutionary

socialists these developments mark the beginning of political awakening of some of the most important allies of the working class.

5. In contrast to the policies of imperialism, the bureaucratic leaderships of Soviet Union and China --- despite their differences and their rhetoric --- continue to follow policies of peaceful co-existence with imperialism, and support the 'progressive' national bourgeois regimes despite the tragic consequences of such policies in Indonesia, Sudan etc.

Thus the narrow interests of these bureaucratic castes have taken precedence over the needs and interests of the world working class. Most political militants in the Indian sub-continent have had very little illusions in the Kremlin bureaucracy. However, many of them had nurtured false hopes in the Maoist leadership. The events in Ceylon and Bangladesh amply demonstrates the counter-revolutionary nature of the Maoist bureaucracy. Whilst the origins, the nature and the extent of the privileges enjoyed by the Soviet and the Chinese bureaucracies are not identical it would be idle to expect either of them to fulfill the tasks of an international revolutionary leadership.

Likewise in all the countries of the Indian sub-continent the Stalinist and Maoist parties --- with their theories of two-stage revolution and alliances with the National bourgeoisie etc --- have not only failed to provide a revolutionary perspective for the working class and its allies but have also reinforced the parliamentary and gradualist illusions of the backward layers of the oppressed, and led them into a blind alley of class collaboration ( and in the case of the Naxalites into mindless adventurism) and defeat.

7. Despite these defeats, the working class and other oppressed layers in the sub-continent continue to demonstrate their combativity and their willingness to struggle. Since the bourgeoisie cannot grant any significant concessions to the working class, or significantly ameliorate the conditions of the intermediary layers of the society, frequent outbreaks of extremely militant struggles will continue to occur until they are resolved by the socialist revolution or temporarily suppressed by a military takeover.

8. This analysis leads us to two important political conclusions, namely:

(a) The post-Independent economic and political development in the Indian sub-continent has amply demonstrated the validity of the Permanent revolution thesis -- the essence of which is that in the period of imperialist decay the national bourgeoisie of the neo-colonial countries cannot achieve even the minimal tasks of the Classical bourgeois democratic revolutions, such as the unification of the agrarian market, implementing a full-scale industrialisation programme, and carrying out an effective programme of agrarian reform.

Even these tasks can be achieved only by the socialist revolution -- that is a revolution led by the working class and supported by the poor peasants, the rural poor and all other oppressed layers of the society. In contrast to the theory of 'two-stage' revolution and the 'bloc of four classes' the revolution on the agenda in the Indian sub-continent is a proletarian revolution which has a combined and an uninterrupted character.

(b) In order to ensure the revolutionary conquest of power by the working class and its allies, it is absolutely necessary to build an organisation which is capable of organising and mobilising the masses in struggle, by its word and deed promote

the self-activity of the masses and in their daily struggles prepare and educate the masses for the revolutionary overthrow of the capitalist state; in other words build a democratic centralist organisation akin to the Bolshevik party. In contrast to the bureaucratic constrictions of the Stalinist and Maoist parties such an organisation must ensure greatest possible internal democracy -- that would facilitate the clash of political ideas and promote political clarity -- including the right to form tendencies.

Such a party, however, cannot function for a long time purely within the confines of one country without its policies and practice being distorted by national and chauvinist pressures, unless it is built as an integral part of a Leninist International. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear to militants all over the world that the international strategy of imperialism cannot be defeated by secret diplomatic deals. Today, more than ever, it requires an international response, a revolutionary counter-offensive, which can only be effectively carried out by a revolutionary International.

Upali Cooray

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9. 'The effects of (ceiling on land) on Landlords varied depending on the tenurial history of the region.....  
In so far as generalisations could be made totally absentee landlordism was no longer considered safe, except by petty rentier with a few acres of land.  
But the crop-sharer remained unprotected and rack renting continued. Those who benefited most were the rich peasants who succeeded in getting together the cash required to buy the ownership of that part of their holdings formerly taken on lease' Utsa Patnaik  
*Scientist Volume 1 No.1\**
10. Goondas are the private police and thugs of the Landlords and the Capitalists.
11. The output of Wheat in India in 1964/65 was 12.4 million



tons; the output of Wheat for the years '67, '68 and '69 were 16.5, 18.7 and 20.0 million tons respectively. See Hari Sharma 'Green Revolution in India - a prelude to a red one?' - *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia* - Monthly Review Press 1973. Similar increases were recorded in Pakistan Punjab where the output of Wheat rose from 4.2 million tons in 1964/65 to 7 million tons in 1969/70 (source: Francine R. Frankel 'Politics of Green Revolution' - Unpublished).

12. The use of high yielding varieties of seed led to massive increase in consumption of chemical fertilizer - e.g. the consumption of nitrogen increased from 538,000 metric tons in 1964/5 to 1.2 million metric tons in 1969/70. Similarly in Pakistan Punjab fertilizer application rose three-fold between 1965/66 and 1968/69. See article of Hari Sharma referred to in note 11 above.
13. There was also a substantial increase in the use of tractors. India now produces about 18,000 tractors and in 1969 imported a further 35,000. And yet in the two factories then in production tractors which were unsold accumulated.
14. In order to ensure the water supplies tube-wells were constructed in those areas where there were no large scale irrigation works. In Pakistan Punjab the number of privately owned tube-wells rose from 32,000 in 1965 to 81,000 in 1971 (Source - Francine R. Frankel 'Politics of Green Revolution').
15. *Commerce* Bombay November 30th 1968.
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17. For instance the Gujar Landlords of Maharashtra have been grabbing the land of the Bhils. See EPW, Feb '72 - page 205.
18. See note 10.
19. In Ceylon the extent of industrialisation has been quite small.
20. From 1961 to 1966 the productivity of labour in Pakistan rose by about 75% while employment increased by 16%. In India corresponding figures were 4% and 3% per annum respectively. In large scale industries of India productivity rose by 7% per annum while the employment opportunities rose by less than 3%.
21. In India the industrial working class is estimated to be about 4.5 millions or about 16 to 20 millions if families are included. - See Bettelheim *India Independent*.
22. The industrial triangle of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras employ the vast majority of the urban workers in India.
23. During the 3rd Five year Plan public investments accounted for 50 to 60% of the total investments.
24. In India the net domestic savings still remain very small - i.e. around 10%.
25. These are investments carried out jointly by the

- government or semi-government corporations and the private sector.
26. The corresponding figure for the top 7 business houses were 20.8% and 19.04% respectively.
  27. 'Finance of large Public companies: 1970/71', *Reserve Bank of India Bulletin* February 1972.
  28. Fourth Five-year Plan of Pakistan, page 15.
  29. G.F.Paponek *Pakistan's development - Social goals and private incentives* Cambridge, Massachussets 1967 page 33.
  30. That is of all the Limited companies quoted in the Karachi stock exchange See M.Baquin 'Savings and Financial flows in the Corporate sector' PDR Autumn 1967.
  31. N.K.Chandra 'Class character of the Pakistani State'- EPW, February 1972 page 289.
  32. D.Ghosh 'Doing without aid' EPW August 1972, page 1459.
  33. K.Haq and M.Baquin 'Savings and Financial flows in the Corporate sector' PDR Autumn 1967.
  34. R.K.Sau 'Indian economic growth' EPW August 72 page 367.
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  36. The Statistical Year Book of Pakistan.
  37. In August 1970 the Minister of State for Home, of India, Mr. N.Mirdha in a statement to the Lok Sabha said that between 1967 and 1969 the number of Harijans murdered all over India was 1117.
  38. In this incident the Landlords dragged as many villagers out of their houses and forced them into one hut and subsequently set fire to it killing 44 people.
  39. EPW February 1972 - page 205.
  40. See 'Island behind bars' - a booklet published by the Ceylon Solidarity Campaign, 9 Dennington Park Mansions, London.
  41. Prit Sappal 'A Marxist critique of Indian Stalinism' in this issue of the journal.
  42. Not all the dissidents who left the CPI(M) joined the CPI(ML); in particular the Nagy Reddy group in Kerala could not reach agreement with Mazumdar & co.
  43. *Pakistan : Military rule or People's power* by Tariq Ali.
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# THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL ON CHILE

## An Inevitable Confrontation

After the defeat of the Bolivian working class in August 1971, Chile became the epicentre of the class struggle in Latin America. The international revolutionary movement followed events in Chile with the knowledge that a trial of strength was inevitable. This trial of strength—prepared for by a series of partial confrontations in the course of the two preceding years and foreshadowed by the attempted coup of 20 June 1973—took place in dramatic fashion on 11 September. The armed forces carried out a criminal attack on the working class, its organisations, its conquests—whether of long standing or of recent date—and on the most elementary democratic rights. Thousands, and probably tens of thousands, of dead in Santiago and the rest of the country have demonstrated once again the barbarity of the so-called 'national' ruling classes and of imperialism. The latter have once more given eloquent and bloody proof that they subordinate every political, juridical or human consideration to the savage and intransigent defence of their threatened interests.

One more tragic confirmation of the danger which a capitalism historically in its death throes still represents for humanity! One more confirmation that the 'principles' and 'values' of a society based on exploitation and repression are a shameful mystification! One more confirmation of the catastrophic consequences for the working class of the illusory and irresponsible perspective of a 'peaceful', 'democratic' transition to socialism—in a world which for over fifty years has seen, on every continent, a succession of local and general wars, revolutionary upheavals, bloody repressions, and fascist or military dictatorships.

## The Programme of the 'Unidad Popular' and the Dynamic of the Mass Mobilisation

The *Unidad Popular's* programme was presented by its supporters as the prelude to a stage in which the transition to socialism would be on the agenda; it aimed to carry out certain reforms within the framework of the capitalist system. This is why the coalition included political formations of petty-bourgeois origin. Worse still, the coalition sought a collaboration with sectors of the bourgeoisie itself and with the party that represented them, and it reaffirmed its total loyalty to the existing constitutional order. This is why the key sectors of the bourgeoisie—who had already supported a moderate reformist path under Frei's presidency—had decided to give the go-ahead to the Allende experiment, under the conditions worked out in the negotiations which followed the 4 September 1970 elections, conditions which included unchanged maintenance of the existing military apparatus. To symbolise the relative continuity of the reformist perspective, the *Unidad Popular* did not propose a new agrarian reform, but confined itself to applying more systematically and more rapidly the reform adopted by Frei.

Nevertheless, the victory of 4 September and Allende's accession to the presidency were seen by the broad masses as a defeat of historic dimensions



inflicted on the class enemy. In fact, a new relation of forces had been created, one more favourable than ever in the past to the working class, the peasantry and the radicalised petty bourgeoisie.

The realisation of the reforms announced in the UP programme and the blow inflicted on imperialist property in the mining sector further stimulated the mass movement. The latter soon showed a tendency to come into conflict with the limits fixed by the reformism which Allende and his coalition advocated. The workers wanted to expropriate the factories which were to remain in the private sector. The peasants had their own interpretation of the agrarian reform. The logic of the fundamental interests at stake determined a rapid development of the dynamic of the class struggle, shattering the pre-established formulae.

The very sectors of the bourgeoisie which had at first been favourable to the UP began to grow alarmed, as they became aware of the dangers which menaced not the 'freedom' of the Chilean people or elementary democratic rights, but their own interests as exploiters. After numerous crises, they moved irrevocably into the opposition camp. The right wing of the UP left the government and broke from the coalition. The Christian Democrats adopted an increasingly aggressive attitude, carried to the point of obstruction and sabotage. As the conflicts grew progressively sharper, the activity of fascist shock brigades and the incitement of petty-bourgeois strata to a reactionary revolt were more and more widely employed as political weapons. Imperialism, and above all US imperialism, made its own contribution of blackmail, threats, pressures and every kind of economic and financial manoeuvre.

The situation thus led to an absolutely clear-cut opposition and drawing of the battle lines between the antagonistic forces, while the petty-bourgeois layers oscillated and divided. Terrified by the dynamic of the mass movement, the bourgeoisie now rejected the reformist road. The proletariat struggled to enlarge the breaches already made in the system and to assert its power. The UP, while it wanted an agreement and desperately sought some compromise, nevertheless could not accept the capitulation demanded by the bourgeoisie, which would have meant cutting itself off from the masses and hence its own demise.

### **The Bourgeoisie Chooses the Path of a Military Coup**

The failure in all essentials of the Christian Democrat plan of forcing Allende to capitulate in a series of partial confrontations and thus progressively eroding key sectors of his mass base, was made clear by the outcome of the struggle of October 1972, by the results of the March elections, and by the impossibility of mobilising more than a derisory percentage of the El Teniente miners in June through a demagogic campaign of sabotage. This failure posed anew, for the Christian Democrats and for the bourgeois front as a whole, the problem of their fundamental strategy. Could they afford to continue playing the game of respect for constitutional norms and utilisation of the mechanisms of the state apparatus to counter and indeed paralyse Allende's actions? Or should they opt for a coup d'état?

The failure of the 29 June attempted coup—over and above any technical errors and setbacks there may have been—reflected the continuing indecision of the bourgeoisie, its internal divisions, and the hesitations of the

armed forces themselves. But Colonel Souper's attempted coup provoked a tremendous mobilisation of the masses, who attained an unprecedented level of radicalisation. More than one thousand factories were occupied by the workers, who exploited to the full the potentialities of the *cordones industriales*—instruments of proletarian democracy thrown up by the struggles of October 1972—in organising their political control and their defence, and who proclaimed their intention of not handing back to the owners even those factories which in principle were included in the private sector. At the same time, the consciousness of the masses made a qualitative leap, grasping the need to arm themselves in order to resist new reactionary attacks.

The Chilean bourgeoisie at once realised that the situation had reached a crucial turning-point. It had suffered a very serious blow to its economic power; it saw that a dual power situation was beginning to emerge, and that embryonic worker militias were being formed. In consultation with the American imperialist leaders, it decided to give up partial confrontations and go for a major trial of strength; to give up using 'legal' tricks and obstructive manoeuvres of every kind, in favour of using arms. The July/August negotiations probably served the purpose either of gaining time or of checking once again, at the eleventh hour, whether it was not possible to force Allende to capitulate without a struggle.

Since Allende was neither able nor willing to capitulate without a struggle, and since the mass movement was not subsiding, the coup was launched with a determination and savagery which, from the viewpoint of defending the interests of the exploiters, were made necessary by a highly explosive situation and an exceptional level of mobilisation.

The Chilean working class opposed the coup d'état with a courage and spirit of sacrifice which will go down in the history of the international workers' movement. The factories were defended gun in hand against the army's attacks; centres of resistance arose both in the very centre of Santiago and in the suburbs; groups of soldiers and sailors of worker and peasant origin, who were not prepared to obey the criminal order of their officers, mutinied with heroism. Despite the massive use of military firepower and of outright massacres, the resistance has not been completely broken. The working class of all continents and democratic public opinion in general have expressed their indignation and condemnation swiftly and on a massive and unprecedented scale.

The working-class movement in Latin America, after receiving a blow in July in Uruguay, has now suffered a defeat of major proportions. If the new military regime manages to consolidate its position, this defeat will weigh heavily in the balance of forces on the continent as a whole.

### **The Lessons of a Tragic Defeat**

For three years the communist and socialist parties of the whole world held up the Chilean example as a proof that their theories concerning the road to socialism were valid. The tragic conclusion of the UP experiment provides a number of key lessons. It was already possible to draw these lessons from innumerable past experiences, especially in Latin America—from the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954 by a mercenary army to the coup, fostered by the imperialists and by the Brazilian gorillas, which installed Banzer in power in Bolivia in August

1971. The fact that these lessons had only been drawn by vanguards which are not yet capable of determining the course of events has been paid for by the Chilean proletariat at an extremely high cost. It is the duty of revolutionaries to fight to ensure that the heroic sacrifice of thousands of Chilean workers is not a vain one, and that the reformist and opportunist mystifications imposed on the masses by the traditional bureaucratic apparatuses are destroyed forever.

Events in Chile over the last three years show just how illusory is the perspective of a democratic, anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist 'stage' of the revolution, in which the 'national' bourgeoisie can participate—illusory both in terms of its objective basis and in terms of political possibilities. No bourgeoisie can go beyond reforms of a strictly limited kind, which do not harm the fundamental interests of imperialism. Moreover, no bourgeoisie is prepared to venture onto this terrain at all unless it has a guarantee that it will be able to control the process strictly and stifle any autonomous dynamic of the mass movement. In this respect, the Peruvian military regime is a classic example.

The Chilean events show that working-class reformism, even in highly favourable conditions, quickly leads into a blind alley. Reforms actually carried out risk being themselves challenged and voided of all content if they are not generalised. Such generalisation inevitably leads to a threshold which cannot be passed without breaking the mechanism of the capitalist system itself. Moreover, partial measures damage multiple interests without destroying them, and provoke the inevitable reaction of forces which still have at their disposal powerful resources and allies. Once again it has been proved that the petty bourgeoisie cannot be won over by a conciliatory attitude, without providing an anti-capitalist perspective and without combating with the utmost determination the manoeuvres of the ruling classes.

The Chilean events show the absurdity of planning for a transition to socialism unaccompanied by the destruction of the state apparatus in its entirety—an apparatus which the ruling classes have organised and structured in the most effective way for the purpose of ensuring the maintenance of their system of exploitation and oppression. This does not mean rejecting any tactical utilisation of legal possibilities, or any exploitation of exceptional circumstances such as the situation created in Chile by the elections of 4 September 1970. But it is essential to understand the absolute and urgent necessity, in a situation of revolutionary mass upsurge, of building revolutionary organs of proletarian democracy—bodies that are at once elements of dual power, weapons of struggle for the conquest of power, and, in embryo, the qualitatively new political structures of the workers' State to which the revolution will give birth.

The Chilean reformists systematically denied this necessity, contenting themselves with promoting bodies with absolutely limited functions and without any real autonomy from the 'constitutional' organs of the State. The workers, however, under the impact of dramatic experiences, especially during the past year, rediscovered these fundamental needs and created bodies rich in revolutionary potential like the *cordones industriales*. But their initiatives developed late and were not generalised. Worse still, they were often partially emptied of their content by the manoeuvres of the bureaucracy, determined to strip the *cordones* of their potential of becoming Chilean soviets and, having drained them of all life, to integrate them



into its own reformist, constitutionalist strategy.

The Chilean events, finally, have shown once again that the thesis that it is possible to overthrow capitalist power without revolutionary violence, without armed struggle, is the most shameful of mystifications, the most suicidal of illusions. It is of primordial necessity to understand that when the crucial moment of the confrontation for power is reached, armed conflict, independently of the specific forces involved, is inevitable in all cases, and that in Lenin's phrase 'the military question is the central political question'.

The working class must prepare itself systematically for such a perspective, rejecting all spontaneist illusions and understanding the necessity, even on this terrain, for centralised action. It must understand that a purely defensive attitude is doomed to failure once the crucial day of reckoning draws near, and must seize the initiative from the enemy.

'Experience in other countries, especially in Latin America,' said the December 1971 Statement by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, 'from the invasion of Guatemala in 1964 to Banzer's coup d'état in Bolivia last August, has shown that the working class must see as a primordial task its own armed defence. This lesson is written in letters of blood—the blood of workers, peasants and students. Any belief in the enemy's 'good will' is suicidal and must be rejected. In view of the nature of the government and the relationship between the UP coalition and the masses in their overwhelming majority, the task to be accomplished is the arming of the workers and peasants, the creation of instruments of political and military self-defence, the formation of genuine people's militias, and the dissemination of revolutionary propaganda among the soldiers. *Not to take any initiative in this direction would mean in practice to gamble on the 'democratic loyalty' of the army and specialised forces of repression*; it would mean to be incapable of responding to a need that is felt by broader and broader sectors of the masses, made aware of the danger by the Bolivian events. *Allende's declarations that the UP will respond to any reactionary violence are nothing but demagogic chatter, inasmuch as they have no practical implication.* Rather than relying on spontaneism and on improvisation, it is necessary to create immediately the requisite means to prevent the class enemy from enjoying material conditions of overwhelming superiority in the confrontations that inevitably lie ahead. So that there can be no misunderstanding, the revolutionary Marxists stress that it is not against Allende but against the threats of the right and to riposte against any attack by the bourgeois repressive apparatus that the workers and peasants must place on the agenda the crucial problem of arming themselves.'

The Chilean reformists contested these elementary truths. The fact that many of them have added their names to the long list of martyrs of the workers' movement neither annuls nor attenuates their massive historic responsibility.

The absence of a revolutionary party capable of playing a hegemonic role at the level of the masses has once again shown itself to be the decisive factor as far as the proletariat is concerned. 'Chile will be no historical exception', said the United Secretariat's December 1971 Statement. 'The overthrow of the capitalist order cannot be accomplished without the decisive intervention of a revolutionary party, the conscious vanguard

of the masses. The tasks which belong to such a party cannot be delegated to the Communist Party. The latter, deeply marked by a long Stalinist tradition, is the expression of an indigenous working-class bureaucracy and of relatively conservative strata of the proletariat which are not mobilising in the present crisis with the same dynamism as the new generation. It retains all its traditional conceptions, not having in any way broken the umbilical cord which links it to the Soviet bureaucracy. Neither can the tasks of the revolutionary party be delegated to the Socialist Party. The latter had extended its mass audience, particularly among the younger workers, and has in its own constituent bodies adopted positions which place it *to the left of the Communist Party* (which is the real spear-head of reformism). But it does not have the structure of a combat party, does not have solid or continuous links with the masses which it influences, and appears more as a conglomeration of tendencies and groups than as a homogenous formation; in short, it has the characteristic features of a *centrist organisation*. It is essential, at all events, to reject any conception based—whether explicitly or implicitly—on the hypothesis that thanks to the dynamism of the revolutionary process and the power of the mass movement, thanks to the weakening of the bourgeoisie and its probable progressive decomposition, and thanks to conditions in which imperialism is forced to relinquish the idea of military intervention, the proletariat will be able to win power even in the absence of a true Leninist revolutionary party. It is essential likewise to reject the variant which effectively holds that a substitute for the revolutionary party will be sufficient—in the present case, in the form of a front grouping all revolutionaries or a cartel of the various organisations of the revolutionary left.'

### **Struggle against the Military Dictatorship! Organise Militant International Solidarity!**

A military coup in a situation like that of Chile in the last few months could not have been imposed unresisted or by means of a limited repressive action. Everything pointed to the likelihood of a courageous and tenacious resistance by the proletariat; it was also not impossible that sectors of the army—whose rank-and-file was made up of sons of workers and peasants carrying out their military service—might rebel against the orders of reactionary officers unleashing a dynamic of civil war. In the event, resistance did indeed develop heroically, and has not been completely crushed; but the second possibility was not realised, or at least not to a sufficient extent to create the preconditions for an immediate civil war.

The problem of the struggle against the military dictatorship is on the agenda. The revolutionary vanguards have the duty to carry out the necessary turn with the maximum speed. The problem of armed struggle is no longer posed in the same terms in which it was posed from September 1970 on. The previous orientation would remain fundamentally valid in the event of a civil war involving the occupation by worker and peasant forces of certain regions of the country. In such circumstances, revolutionaries would put forward the slogan, on a world scale, of creating international brigades.

It is necessary to create, throughout the world, a campaign of active solidarity evoking the best traditions of mobilisation for Vietnam. Working-class in Chile must be defended against the barbarity of golpistas and

their 'national-bourgeois' and imperialist patrons.

For immediate, massive, militant solidarity with the Chilean proletariat! Halt the criminal hand of the murderers! Demand the re-establishment of the elementary democratic rights of the Chilean people! Demand the immediate freeing of all political prisoners! Defend the right of asylum for political refugees from the other Latin American countries and their right to go to another country of their own choosing! Give political and material assistance to the heroic resistance of the Chilean workers!

Imperialism and the so-called national bourgeoisie are congratulating themselves cynically on the blow they have inflicted on the Chilean workers and peasants—indeed on the entire worker and peasant movement in Latin America and throughout the world. But the enormity of the crime and the heroism of the resistance will have incalculable repercussions. The Chilean events will accelerate the ripening of revolutionary consciousness, just as did imperialism's criminal war and the heroic struggle of the people in Vietnam. Capitalism will pay for its present—and historically ephemeral—victory in Chile by a dramatic deepening of its own contradictions.

### IN OUR NEXT ISSUE

1. Modes of production, Social Formations and Uneven and Combined development.
2. Ceylon — the repression and after.
3. The struggle in the Arab East.



# A MARXIST CRITIQUE OF INDIAN STALINISM

The CPI (M) in Article 113 of its Party Programme states:—‘the Communist Party of India (Marxist) strives to achieve the establishment of **people’s democracy** and socialist transformation through peaceful means. By developing a powerful mass revolutionary movement, by combining parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forms of struggle, the working class and its allies will try their utmost to overcome the resistance of forces of reaction and bring about this transformation through peaceful means.’

At the end of this paragraph, the CPI (M) added a general warning:—‘However, it needs always to be borne in mind that the ruling classes never relinquish their power voluntarily. They seek to defy the will of the people and seek to reverse it by lawlessness and violence.’ (1) (Emphasis added)

The CPI (M) has summed up its whole philosophy in the above paragraph. On this hinges its strategy and tactics of Popular Front politics.

The CPI (M) makes two points in article 113.

1. It will establish a *system of government which it would call People’s Democracy*, through which it will transform bourgeois property relations into socialist ones.

2. This process will take place through peaceful means, that is, without destroying the bourgeois state machinery—the guardian of bourgeois property relations and a general warning to be vigilant. That is, if the bourgeoisie attacked the process of peaceful transition to socialism, then, and only then, the CPI (M) will fight back.

Let us take these issues one by one:

## PEOPLE’S DEMOCRACY OR DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT?

What is the form of state that is needed to change the bourgeois property relations into socialist ones? All the greatest Marxist teachers from Marx to Trotsky have repeatedly demonstrated that without the dictatorship of the proletariat based on workers’ councils and, in a backward country, based on workers’ and poor peasants’ councils, it is impossible to transform the bourgeois property relations into socialist ones. While the form of workers’ and poor peasants’ councils may differ from country to country, nevertheless, their basic content remains the same.

But, the CPI (M) holds a different position. It proposes the establishment of a People’s Democracy based on the ‘coalition of all genuine anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces, headed by the working class.’ (2)

The CPI (M) holds this position because, according to its analysis, India is being ruled by bourgeois-landlord class, headed by the big bourgeoisie. Therefore, in its opinion, the main enemies of the Indian masses are imperialism, the big bourgeoisie and the landlords. From this the CPI (M) derives a reactionary and utopian theory of forming a coalition govern-

ment of anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces based on a worker-peasant alliance. This coalition is to be made up of the National bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeoisie and peasantry, and led by the working class. This chimerical theory of Stalin is called the 'bloc of four classes'. The concept of peoples democracy is thus directed against the bourgeois-landlord class rule headed by the big bourgeoisie and dominated by imperialism. And it is assumed that anti-imperialist forces of 'four classes' could be welded together against their common enemy—imperialism and the big bourgeoisie—despite the irreconcilable class contradictions within such a bloc.

This very concept that a coalition of the working class, national bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeoisie and the peasantry could be formed, under the hegemony of the working class, is an absurd notion. In the last analysis the class interests of the national bourgeoisie coincides with that of the big-bourgeoisie. There are, of course, contradictions between the two. At times the national bourgeoisie has to be pulled into line. On the other hand the contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and the working class is of a qualitatively different nature since they are irreconcilable contradictions; under the rule of the working class it faces the death sentence along with the big bourgeoisie, as the means of production they control today would be expropriated and socialised. It follows from this that coalition of the above named forces cannot arise under the leadership of the working class. If such a coalition was to come into being it would be under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie, since the latter would never accept the hegemony of their future expropriators—the working class.

Let us deal with the question from another angle; the history of Soviet Russia between February and October 1917. Let us briefly examine the history of Russia and trace the positions taken by Lenin in relation to the imperialist dominated bourgeois-landlord rule dominated by the big bourgeoisie. Lenin wrote in his famous April Theses that the February Revolution has overthrown the 'old Czarist power which represented only a handful of feudal Landlords' and 'state power in Russia has passed into the hands of a new class, namely, the bourgeoisie and the landlords who had become bourgeois; but having come to power, the bourgeoisie has formed a bloc (an alliance) with the overt monarchists' and the key, the decisive ministerial posts in the new government (the Ministry of the Interior and the War ministry—ie the command over the army, the police and the bureaucracy—the entire repressive apparatus) are held by outright monarchists and supporters of the system of big landed estates.' (3)

Now let us see what was the relationship between the Provisional Government prior to the October revolution, and the imperialist powers especially Britain and France.

According to Lenin, the provisional government was 'subordinated to the interest of Russian capital and its powerful protector and master, Anglo-French imperialist capital, the wealthiest in the world . . . ' (4)

Judging from the criterion of the CPI (M), the Provisional Government (like the Indian Congress) ruled in the name of bourgeois-landlord classes headed by the big bourgeoisie. So, in the opinion of these gentlemen, Lenin should have given the slogan of 'people's democracy', rather than the dictatorship of the proletariat!

In spite of the fact that the vast landed possessions of the Russian feudal landlords had not been abolished, and that Russia was tied 'hand and foot'

to Anglo-French capital, Lenin insisted that the dictatorship of proletariat was the only correct slogan. He condemned Stalin and Kamanev—the editors of Pravda, organ of the Bolshevik Party—who supported the Provisional Government of Prince Lvov on the condition that it 'fortifies' the gains of the February Revolution. It may be said here that the attitude of the 'Marxist'—Joyti Basu, Namboodripad and Co—towards Indhira Ghandi's nationalisation of 14 big banks, abolition of Privy Purses and the bourgeois land reforms, which serve the interests of the bourgeoisie, is analogous with Stalin's qualified support to the provisional government of Lvov. Lenin however, had stressed 'no support whatever to the Provisional Government.'

He ridiculed the theories like People's Democracy (or national democracy, as propagated by the CPI, the Right Stalinist party) based on the bloc of the four classes. He explained that states such as 'People's Democracy' which work within the framework of bourgeois state structure are incapable of carrying out the transition to socialism. The February Revolution could be transformed into the socialist revolution only by establishing the soviets of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies i.e the dictatorship of the proletariat supported by the poor peasantry. Lenin wrote:—

'The distinction between Marxism and anarchism is that Marxism recognises the necessity of the state for the purpose of the transition to socialism; but (and here is where we differ from Kautsky and Co) [the reader may add the names of Sundria, Dange and Co] not a state of the type of the usual parliamentary bourgeois-democratic republic, but a state like the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Soviets of Workers' Deputies of 1905 and 1917.' (5)

We completely reject the Kautskyist concept of People's Democracy now received by the Stalinists:

## PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM

We have already noted in the beginning, that the Stalinists seek to achieve socialist transformation through peaceful means. However, they have tagged on a general warning to be vigilant. This vaguely formulated warning is meant to deceive the cadres who know that the state is an engine of oppression of the exploiting classes and it can never be overthrown except through revolutionary violence—that is ABC of Marxism-Leninism.

On the one hand, the CPI and the CPI (M) leaderships accord theoretical concessions to the ruling classes; on the other hand they deceive the cadres of their respective parties. They have genuflected before the ruling classes assuring them that they stand for 'peaceful transition to socialism'. They have assured the confirmed 'socialist' Birla and Tata that they are all brothers and the latter must not misunderstand the sheep in the wolf's skin. ('Democratic Socialism is the country's goal and ideal,' said R.D. Birla—the great industrialist—to the shareholders of Century Spinning and Manufacturing Mill on June 26, 1970. Similar sentiments were expressed by JDR Tata in the Rotary club of Bombay on August 25, 1970: 'I genuinely believe in the modern 20th Century Socialism as a politico-economic way of life . . .') And on the other hand they feed the party cadres with vague slogans about extra-parliamentary forms of struggle.



'Extra-parliamentary forms of struggle' does not mean revolutionary overthrow of the exploiting classes. Were the Ghandian Satyagrahas not extra-parliamentary forms of struggle? Of course they were. Forceable overthrow of the exploiting classes cannot be expressed in any simpler form; because to do so is to deceive oneself and others.

A revolutionary party must be judged not only by what it says but also by its deeds. This is the sole guarantee, the only yard-stick which demonstrates whether a working class party is revolutionary or not. The revolutionary theory must proceed hand in glove with the revolutionary deeds. In the contrary case, the revolutionary theory remains simple phrase-mongering and a betrayal of Marxism-Leninism.

We will soon expose these empty phrase-mongers from their own documents, that their calls to be 'vigilant' and to use 'Extra-parliamentary forms of struggle'—if it means anything—are a smoke screen to deceive the party cadres.

Let us examine a few of the documents of CPI (M). On January 30, 1966, *Peoples' Democracy*—the official organ of CPI (M)—published a letter to Nanda by Basuvapunniah, a member of the central committee of CPI (M). He wrote:

'Unlike the earlier rare and exceptional possibilities of peaceful transition to socialist revolution, new additional possibilities of it in some countries have been visualised under new world conditions that are obtaining today . . . it is expected that all this would greatly restrain the ruling classes from resorting to the adventure of violence and in some countries at least, certain possibilities have arisen for such a peaceful path to be explored and utilised by the communists of those countries. It is exactly on the basis of this new assessment that we have introduced this new concept of peaceful transition to socialism in our Party Programme. The formulation of this concept as well as the general warning against the danger of violence usually unleashed by the ruling classes is exactly similar to the one put forth in the Programme of Dangeites.' [By Dangeites, Basavapunniah means Communists Party of India. PS]

Basuvapunniah has been much impressed by the 'British Road to Socialism'. This document was first printed on Stalin's approval in 1951. It openly states that socialism can be achieved in Britain by 'peaceful means and without armed struggle'. The 'British Road to Socialism', is a counter-revolutionary document to sabotage the British Socialist Revolution, to keep the British working class continually bogged down in parliamentarism. One thing must be said about British Stalinists. True, they are traitors to Marxism-Leninism, but they are at least 'honest' to admit their impotence. But Basuvapunniah and Co do not have even that much of 'morality'.

Basuvapunniah and Co and their co-thinkers in England have closed their eyes to the *oppressive state* of British Imperialism. The deployment of the British Army against the Irish working class and internment camps in Ireland to thwart the attempt of the Irish people to overthrow the imperialist yoke, enactment of anti-union laws, dragging the unions in the National Industrial Relations Court and heavily fining them for their 'crime'—that is, for fighting for a better standard of living—and taking away of the basic democratic rights of the working class by the British bourgeoisie makes it amply clear that the British ruling class would go to

any extent to defend its class rule and bourgeois property relations. Basuapunniah and his party, as a matter of fact, endorse the British Road to Socialism and draw inspiration from this reformist document. 'Letter to Nanda', Art. 113 of the Party Programme of CPI (M) and other relative documents (which we shall soon discuss), are a clear revision of the Marxist theory of the State.

Marx, Engels and Lenin had gone to great lengths to explain the meaning of the State and the reason why it is impossible to carry out a revolution by peaceful means. Now, all the Marxist teachings particularly on the State have been completely forgotten or have been opportunistically ignored.

According to Marx, the State is an organ of class rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another. The State did not come into existence to reconcile the class antagonism. On the contrary, it has appeared like a mole on the skin of the society because of the irreconcilability of class antagonism. The State which apparently appears to be standing above society in fact is an organ of class rule to keep its adversary in awe. The working class must smash this organ of class rule of the bourgeoisie and erect in its place its own State—the proletarian State—to keep its adversary—the expropriated bourgeois class in awe.

The working class cannot use the organ of class rule of its adversary. If it were to attempt to do so, then the proletarian revolution would inevitably turn into a bourgeois counter-revolution. For example CPI (M) strives to achieve a majority in the parliament to bring in Socialism through peaceful means; let us suppose that it secures such a majority in the parliament.

Then one of two courses would inevitably follow:

First: either the CPI (M), like all the Social Democratic parties of the Second International, would turn into a direct agent (it is already an indirect agent) of the bourgeoisie.

Secondly: or the counter-revolution would inevitably take place, if it used the 'ready-made State machinery and wielded it for its own purpose'.

This is the lesson that the Paris Commune has taught.

Arguing against the renegade Kautsky who had lost sight of one of the most important aspects of the State, that is, the inevitability of violent revolution, Lenin wrote:

'... if the State is the product of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms, if it is a power standing above society and "increasingly alienating itself from it", then it is obvious that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution but also without the destruction of the apparatus of State power which was created by the ruling class ...' (7) (Emphasis added)

Secondly, parliament or the legislative body is not a State in itself. It is one of the constituents of the State—only a second rate constituent. The parliament, according to Lenin, is a 'talking shop'. The real power of the State lies not in parliament but in other constituents of the State, that is to say, in the standing army, the police, the bureaucracy, judges and jails. A standing army and the police are the chief instruments of State

power.

Therefore, the proletariat can seize political power and establish its dictatorship not by securing a majority in parliament but by smashing the chief instruments of State power. Herein lies the importance of violent revolution.

Marx once entertained the idea that in Britain and in America, it seemed possible that revolutions could succeed without the precondition of destroying the 'ready-made State machinery'. What was the reason for that 'restriction' made by Marx, what Basuvapunniah calls 'earlier rare and exceptional possibilities'? Does it mean that Marx stood for a 'peaceful transition to socialism'? Not in the least! Lenin explained the reason for this 'restriction' in his brilliant book *The State and Revolution*: 'This was understandable in 1871, when Britain was still the model of a purely capitalist country, but without a **militarist clique** and, to a considerable degree, **without a bureaucracy**. Marx therefore included Britain, where a revolution, even a peoples' revolution, then seemed possible, and indeed was possible, **without** the preliminary condition of destroying the 'ready-made State machinery'. (Emphasis in original)

'Today, in 1917 [and in 1972 too], in the epoch of the first great imperialist war, this restriction made by Marx is no longer valid.'

Why is it no longer valid?

Lenin explains:

'Both Britain and America . . . had no militarist cliques and bureaucracy, have completely sunk into the all-European filthy, bloody morass of bureaucratic-military institutions . . . Today, in Britain and in America too, the 'preliminary condition for every real peoples' revolution' is the **smashing, the destruction** of the 'ready-made State machinery'. (8)

The following are the lessons which are drawn from the Marxist theory of the State.

1. The State is an organ of class-rule.
2. The bourgeois State machinery possesses sharp teeth which it digs into the heart of the working class. Bureaucracy, police and standing army are among the sharpest.
3. The bourgeois State cannot be superseded by the proletarian State, except through violent revolution.
4. The need for a violent revolution lies in the fact that the bourgeois State possesses the most coercive instruments—bureaucracy, standing army—which must be smashed by the proletariat as it cannot make use of 'ready-made State machinery'.
5. The last and most important conclusion drawn is this, that 'peaceful' revolution against the bourgeoisie is possible **only under one condition**: that is, if the State does not possess bureaucracy, police and the standing army.

Let us go back to Art. 113 and the 'Letter to Nanda' and examine them in the light of Marxist teachings on the State. Both these documents clearly express the views that CPI (M) '**strives** (tries hard) to achieve the establishment of people's democracy and socialist transformation through **peaceful means**.' (Art. 113. emphasis added).



A revolutionary party in India can strive to achieve socialism through peaceful means in India only on **one condition**, that is to say, if the bureaucracy, the police and the standing army—the coercive instruments of the State—are not at the command of the Indian bourgeois State.

**If the Indian bourgeois State does not possess these coercive instruments, in that case, peaceful transition is not only possible but desirable.**

But is this the reality? Any worker or a student who has come into contact with the Indian State machine—as they invariably do in the course of their efforts to exercise elementary democratic rights such as a strike action or a demonstration—would be able to explain its repressive nature, in other words that it is a strong and centralised bureaucratic-military apparatus. To talk about the overthrow of such a well organised organ of class rule by peaceful means amounts to renegacy and treachery. Basuvapunniah in his letter to Nanda revises Marxism when he writes ‘unlike the earlier rare and exceptional possibilities of peaceful transition to Socialist revolution, new (!) additional possibilities of it (of peaceful transition) in some countries have visualised.’

What were those exceptions? According to Marx England and America may be exceptions because the bureaucratic militarism was missing in those countries. Is it the case today? And what was Lenin’s opinion on the subject in 1917? He said that this ‘restriction made by Marx was no longer valid’ because both these countries ‘have sunk into the all-European filthy, bloody morass of bureaucratic -military institution.....’

Basuvapunniah talks about ‘new additional possibilities’ that have arisen in some countries that make this peaceful transition possible. What are they? Would these gentlemen please enlighten us on them; has the standing army of these countries been dissolved? As long as the coercive instrument of the bourgeoisie remains intact its replacement by the proletarian state is not possible by gradual and peaceful means. The Stalinist leadership of the CPI and the CPI (M) who preach such concepts have abandoned Marxism-Leninism and taken the road of Kautskyism and counter-revolution.

Let those rank and file comrades in CPI (M), who after reading a warning to be ‘vigilant’ in Art.113, according to Basuvapunniah, himself, is exactly similar to the one put forth in the Programme of the Dangeites.

Let us go on and take another document—*Stand on Ideological Issues*—which throws brilliant light on CPI (M)’s stand on peaceful transition to Socialism.

In this document, the Stalinists have **fraudulently** counterposed the basic philosophy of violent revolution which lies at the root of all the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, to the theory of: ‘violence is alien to Marxist-Leninist ideals’.

Under the heading ‘On the Form of Transition to Socialism’ in the above mentioned document the Stalinists repeat by rote, that the State is the ‘special organisation of force’, it is ‘an *organisation* of violence for the suppression of some class.’ That is true! But the conclusion they draw from it is not that the bourgeois State must be overthrown by violent revolution. Instead they draw an absurd and counter-revolutionary conclusion:

'... that violence is alien to the Marxist-Leninist ideals. The foremost thinkers, founders and leaders of Marxism-Leninism were always eager to find out ways and means to restrict, minimise and, if possible, to avoid the bourgeois violence in the way of effecting the Socialist revolution, since peaceful transition is advantageous to the proletariat. Any number of instances from the history of the working class movement can be cited to substantiate this proposition of ours.' (9)

To give force to their proposition they bring out the instances of Britain and America about which Marx had once said that peaceful revolution was possible there, (we have already answered this question)—and of the Russian Revolution, where Lenin had visualised the possibility of a peaceful transition to Socialist revolution as an exception.

Here, does Lenin's view negate the Marxist theory of the State? Not in the least. Lenin's views were thoroughly consistent with the Marxist theory of the State. Lenin held these views because after the February Revolution dual power had come into existence, because the coercive instruments of the State power which were previously held by the Czarist State had passed into the hands of the Soviets of workers, peasants and soldiers deputies. In a word, the real State power lay in the Soviets not in the Provisional Government.

To substantiate this proposition—violence is alien to Marxist-Leninist ideals—they cite Lenin (mis-stating the substance of it) where he said that 'violence is, of course, alien to our ideals'. Let us cite this quotation in full:

'However, it cannot be denied that in individual cases, by way of exception, for instance in some small country, after the social revolution has been accomplished in a neighbouring big country—peaceful surrender of power by the bourgeoisie is possible, if it is convinced that resistance is hopeless and if it prefers to save its skin. It is much more likely, of course, that even in small states, Socialism will not be achieved without civil war, and for that reason the only programme of international Social Democracy must be recognition of civil war, though violence is, of course, alien to our ideals. The same, *mutatis mutandis* (with the necessary alterations), is applicable to nations.' (10)

The Stalinists are not only experts at citing quotations of Marx, Engels or Lenin out of context and misusing them, but also distorting, forging and perverting them.

In the quotation of Lenin just cited, a small, only a very small forgery has been committed to change its substance and to turn it on its head.

When citing Lenin, the Stalinists have retained Lenin's emphasis where they needed it and done away with it when it went against their proposition of peaceful transition to Socialism. They did away with Lenin's emphasis upon three words: 'not', 'only' and 'necessary' and retained the emphasis on the word 'possible'.

At first sight, this little 'forgery' may not look very significant but it is decisive.

When Lenin said that peaceful surrender of power in small states is possible, he said it not without qualifications. The first condition is that socialist revolution in a neighbouring big country must have taken

place. Secondly the bourgeoisie of the small state must have no alternative, that is the bourgeoisie must be convinced that the resistance to proletarian offensive is futile.

Laying down this proposition of possibility, Lenin emphatically stressed that **even** in a small country it is much more likely that Socialism will **not** be achieved without civil war. (Here Lenin deliberately emphasised the word 'not' which the Stalinists quietly did away with ). Therefore Lenin stressed that the '**only** programme' of Social Democracy (this is the Communists') must be recognition of civil war, 'though violence is, of course, alien to our ideals'. (Here again, Lenin particularly emphasised the word '**only**', but the Stalinists quietly removed the emphasis.) [See Lenin's collected works vol 23 p. 69]

According to Lenin, the **only** programme of the Communists is the recognition of civil war, insurrection and violent revolution.

But the Stalinists draw an opposite conclusion. Because violence is alien to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, therefore they must strive to achieve socialism through peaceful means. Let us quote their deductions in order to avoid the accusation of falsification and distortion.

'To conclude, there is no denying the fact that the proletariat would prefer to achieve the revolution and win power by peaceful means. Marx, Engels and Lenin, as the foremost leaders of the world proletariat, did strive to achieve the socialist revolution by peaceful means wherever and whenever such an opportunity did open before them without allowing it to be missed.

'Guided by their great teaching and their practice, our Party, as correctly incorporated in our Party Programme, "strives to achieve the establishment of People's Democracy and Socialist transformation through peaceful means", while, of course, not forgetting for a moment that the ruling classes seek to bar this road at every turn by resorting to violence and terror and hence the need to be ever vigilant and prepared to meet all such emergencies.' (11)

A revolutionary party based on Marxism-Leninism shall deal with the question of revolution from an entirely different plank than that of the Stalinists.

Marxism-Leninism teaches that the dictatorship of the exploiting class **cannot** be overthrown except through violent revolution. Therefore, the primary function of a revolutionary party is to develop the revolutionary consciousness of the working class and to aim it ideologically. In the course of revolution, if by way of exception such a situation arises that peaceful surrender of power by the ruling class becomes possible [which, of course, in the era of death agony of capitalism is not possible], then such an opportunity must be grasped. Because, we the Communists, apply revolutionary violence in order to defeat counter-revolutionary violence.

This question (violence is alien to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism) has been posed by the Stalinist in a most opportunist way. 'Violence is alien to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism'! yes, but when, where and under what circumstances? That is the question! 'Violence is alien to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism'! that is true, but it does not negate the Marxist



theory of State!

Replying to Kautsky, the leader of the 'stinking corpse' of the Second International who like the Stalinists advocated that violence is alien to the ideals of Marxism, Lenin wrote:

'Socialism is opposed to violence against nations. This is indisputable. But Socialism is opposed to violence against men in general. Apart from Christian-anarchists and Tolstoyans, however, no one has yet drawn the conclusion from this that Socialism is opposed to **revolutionary** violence. Hence to talk about 'violence' in general, without examining the condition which distinguishes reactionary from revolutionary violence, means being a petty bourgeois who renounces revolution or else it means simply deceiving oneself and others by sophistry.' (12) (Emphasis in original)

The main aim of a revolutionary party is to **smash the bourgeois State**—the engine of oppression and violence—and then end exploitation of man by man. After the proletariat has established its **dictatorship**, the proletariat would avoid if possible, or use minimum revolutionary force to expropriate the dethroned ruling class. And it entirely depends upon the amount of resistance offered by the overthrown class.

In this sense, violence and terror is alien to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism.

The question at issue, at present, is not how to use the proletarian State machine but how to smash the bourgeois State apparatus! The question is, can the proletariat establish its dictatorship without violent revolution? Our categorical answer to this question, in the epoch of the death agony of capitalism, is, NO.

The Stalinists present Marx, Engels and Lenin as Gandhians and harmless icons. They distort and vulgarise their teachings when they write—'Marx, Engels and Lenin did strive to achieve the Socialist revolution by peaceful means'.

Here is an answer to these traitors to Marxism-Leninism by Lenin:

The philosophy of 'violent revolution lies at the root of all the teaching of Marx and Engels. The betrayals of their teachings by the now predominant Social-Chauvinist and Kautskyite trends is expressed in relief by the neglect of such propaganda and agitation by both these trends.' (13)

Stalinists, in fact, have gone back to Kautskyism. Lenin called the 'peaceful transition to socialism' a **petty bourgeois utopia**. In *State and Revolution* Lenin wrote:

'The petty-bourgeois democrats, those sham socialists who have replaced class struggle by dreams of class harmony, even pictured the Socialist transformation in a dreamy fashion—not as the overthrow of the rule of the exploiting class, but as the peaceful submission of the minority to the majority which has become conscious of its aims. This **petty-bourgeois utopia**, which is inseparably connected with the idea of the State being above classes, led in practice to the betrayal of interests of the working classes . . . ' (14)

Finally, we shall quote another quotation from *State and Revolution* by Lenin:

'The **supercession** of the bourgeois state by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution.' (15) (Emphasis added)

The study of the above-cited quotations from the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, makes it amply clear that the enthroned ruling class cannot be dethroned except through violent revolution. Hundreds more quotations can be cited from their works to show their philosophical views on violent revolution.

It must be emphasised here, that the present era—of death agony of capitalism—does not permit any exception, does not permit the peaceful surrender of power by the bourgeoisie even in a small country bordering a State where the Socialist Revolution has taken place. The history of Vietnam and Korea vividly exhibit that dying imperialism, in order to prolong its life, would throw its last ounce of strength in the arena to bar the way of revolution. Bangla Desh has clearly shown that imperialism is in no mood even to tolerate the struggles for independence, let alone the Socialist revolution.

India occupies a very significant position, not only in the East but in the whole world. Not only is peaceful transition to Socialism not possible in India, but on the contrary, the bitterest civil war will be fought there. Imperialism will not, under any circumstances, permit India to go red without suffering a crushing defeat.

## THE POPULAR FRONT

The Communist party of India, after a brief left opportunist phase during the late forties', relapsed into its Popular front politics (of the mid-thirties) in 1952; they called it the 'united front' strategy. The so called united fronts which it initiated with the 'democratic' and 'left' parties in fact ended up being fronts with reactionary bourgeois-landlord and communal parties. This is yet another consequence of their efforts to achieve 'peaceful transition to socialism'. They formed alliances with parties such as the Akali Dal and Muslim League, which are not only religious and communal parties but also organisations which, according to even the CPI (M), represented the interests of 'Landlord, trader, capitalist' (16) This, of course, did not prevent the CPI (M) too making alliances with religious-communal organisations. In contrast to this wheeling and dealing of the Stalinists, with religious and obscurantist forces, Lenin stressed 'the need for struggle against the clergy and other influential reactionary and medieval elements in backward countries'. (17) Rejecting alliances with the communal parties Lenin emphasised 'the need to combat the Pan-Islamic and similar trends'—(quite clearly trends such as the Akali Dal and the Muslim league)—because they 'attempt to strengthen the positions of the Khans, landowners Mullahs etc'. (18) As for the Stalinists, they were not ashamed to take part even in the Gurudwara (Sikh Temple) elections.

Furthermore the CPI (M) entered into a secret understanding with the Syndicate Congress and the Jana Sang in Kerala, and when the facts came to light the CPI (M) did not directly admit it; instead they tried to white-wash the whole murky affair by stating that they 'went to the extent of supporting candidates whose links are known to be with Syndicate' and who were 'actively linked with Jana Sang'. (19) While on the one hand the

Central committee of the CPI (M) dismisses the fact of alliance with the Syndicate Congress as a 'slander', on the other hand it admits its support for the 'five candidates who were known to be closely associated with the Syndicate Congress' (our emphasis) (20). Again in relation to the Punjab State elections in 1972, H.S. Surjeet, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPI (M) denied the existence of any alliance with the Akali Dal but then went on to say 'we shall oppose bourgeois-landlord Akali candidates, we shall support those individual candidates of the Akali party who will swear (perhaps on the Guru Granth Sahb—PS) to protect (!) the right of the people and who have already proved this to a certain extent by virtue of their previous public work'. (21). Despite the efforts of Mr Surjeet to pull wool over our eyes it is clear that the CPI (M) had an electoral understanding with the Akali Dal. Surjeet's efforts to draw a fine line of demarcation between the individual members of the Akali Dal and the Akali Dal itself is truly remarkable. His party would not support the communal bourgeois-landlord Akali Dal but supports, maybe, only the non-communal bourgeois-landlord candidates of the Akali Dal! These electoral acrobatics of the CPI (M) amply demonstrate the nature of the political practice that flows from their efforts to seek alliances with the 'progressive national bourgeoisie'.

## UNITED FRONT VS THE POPULAR FRONT

As long as we are numerically weak and as long as the working class still follows the reformist leaderships, we are in favour of united fronts 'within certain limits and on specific issues to correlate in practice our actions, with those of reformist organisations, to the extent to which the latter still express today the will of important sections of the embattled proletariat' (22) and the poor peasantry. When we enter into a united front with a reformist party of the working class, we always maintain the freedom to criticise our temporary ally whenever it tends to betray the cause of the united front. We are completely against the Stalinist concept of popular front in which a working class party makes alliances with the 'progressive bourgeoisie'. Why do we oppose such alliances? Because both the past history of the working class movement as well as the contemporary events confirms the analysis of Lenin in his article Marxism and Revisionism, where he states

'the experience of alliances, agreements, and blocs with the liberal reformists in the West and with the liberal reformist (Constitutional-Democrat) in Russian revolution conveniently showed that **these agreements only blunt the consciousness of the masses, that they weaken rather than enhance the actual significance of their struggle** by linking the fighters with those who are least capable of fighting and who are most vacillating and treacherous.' (23)

Though the gentlemen of CPI (M) did not have the courage to openly refute Lenin on this point, nevertheless, they reject his analysis. In their opinion, the above cited position of Lenin is irrelevant as far as India is concerned. This is how they revise Lenin:

'Lenin's insistence that revolutionary social-democratic parties of his days, in imperialist countries and States should not form 'alliances or blocs' with liberal bourgeoisie of those countries and States, because they are bound to be counter-revolutionary. His specific mention of 'social reform liberals in west and liberal reformist (cadits) in Russian



revolution' does not permit any confusion. Again the critics tend to ignore the fact that Lenin drew clear distinction between the revolution in an imperialist country and the one in an **oppressed country** and permitted temporary agreement and alliance on certain conditions with the bourgeoisie of the oppressed countries by the Proletariat and its Party.' (24)

It is clear from the above quotation that the Stalinist leadership agrees that alliances with the liberal bourgeoisie are not permissible in Imperialist countries and in Russia; but they are permissible in an 'oppressed' country. Since they consider India as an oppressed country, therefore, they can go ahead with their efforts to form United Fronts with the arch-reactionary parties like the Muslim League.

Nowhere have these gentlemen attempted to explain the meaning of 'oppressed' country.

According to Lenin, oppressed nations are those 'which are either direct colonial dependents or represent semi-colonies as for example, Persia, Turkey and China, or having suffered defeat at the hands of big imperialist power, have been made greatly dependent on that power by virtue of peace treaties.' (25)

Does India come in the category of 'oppressed' country in the Leninist sense?

India is neither a colony nor defeated by **big imperialist power**. Then is India a semi-colony? Or is Indian independence formal?

But gentlemen of the CPI (M) you have categorically rejected the concept of 'formal independence' in your document 'Ideological debate summed up'. Your Party Programme admits that on 15th August, 1947, the political rule of the British had ended and, 'a State headed by the Indian bourgeoisie was established' and the hope of British imperialism to make India's independence merely formal 'has been belied'. (26)

Secondly, Lenin had permitted alliance with bourgeois Parties—fighting for national independence—against the enslaving imperialist power. But the CP's were not to merge with the bourgeois parties despite their 'earliest embryonic form'.

After the attainment of national independence the period of alliances with the national bourgeoisie has come to an end. No more justification remains for such alliances now.

It may be pointed out here, even in the period of struggle for national independence, alliance with the bourgeois democratic movement does not mean tailing behind the national bourgeoisie or entering into the bourgeois party as the CPI or the CPC did. Alliance is made in order to utilise the national bourgeoisie to bring the mass of the workers and peasants under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist party. But the Communist Party of India did exactly the opposite.

Let us take this question from another angle. As we have pointed out previously, the Stalinists admit that alliances with liberal reformists in the 'imperialist' countries and in **Russia** were not permitted.

If alliances with the liberal bourgeoisie in Czarist Russia were not permissible, we wonder how such alliances are permissible in today's India.

1. India, like Czarist Russia, is an independent country dominated by imperialist finance capital.

If Indian industry is dominated by collaboration agreements with Imperialist finance capital, worse was the position of Russian industry before the October Revolution. In the words of Trotsky:

Russian 'Heavy industry (metal, coal, oil) was almost wholly under the control of foreign finance capital, which had created for itself an auxiliary and intermediate system of banks in Russia. **Light industry was following the same road.** Foreigners owned in general about 40% of all stock capital of Russia, but in the leading branches of industry that percentage was still higher. We can say without exaggeration that controlling shares of stock in Russian banks, plants, and factories were to be found abroad, the amount held in England, France and Belgium being almost double that in Germany.' (27)

According to Lenin, Russia was 'bound hand and foot' by Anglo-French capital.

2. The task before Russia was the completion of the democratic revolution by the Russian bourgeoisie. But the **belated** bourgeoisie was incapable of carrying out its historical tasks. Therefore the Russian democratic revolution could be completed only by the proletariat by establishing its dictatorship with the support of the peasantry, thus transforming it into a **Socialist** revolution.

The position in India is similar. The Indian bourgeoisie for fear of the working class and poor peasantry, has come to terms with the reactionary landlord class. It is afraid to carry out the democratic revolution to its completion. The Indian democratic revolution can only be thoroughly accomplished by the proletariat with the support of poor peasantry. The proletariat can accomplish this task not by making 'United Front' with the bourgeoisie, but ruthlessly exposing these so called democratic parties among the masses and winning other oppressed layers to their side.

Lenin was opposed to alliances with the liberal bourgeoisie **even against czarist feudalism**. He would have called these 'Marxist' pundits who preach alliance with one section of the bourgeoisie against another section, traitors of the working class.

All these twists and turns of the Stalinists and their deliberate distortion and vulgarisation of Marxism-Leninism is intended to cover up their counter-revolutionary practice, past and present.

In defence of their 'united front' politics, the gentlemen of the Polit Bureau try to use **Left-wing communist and infantile disorder** by Lenin to distort Leninism. They ask:

'are these comrades (From Andhra) doing justice to Lenin and his teaching on the United Front tactics by invoking this specific quotation from him to fight against the United Front tactics of our Party in Kerla and West Bengal? Lenin also says 'The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by most thorough, careful, attentive, skilful and **obligatory** use of any, even the smallest rift between the enemies, any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or type of bourgeoisie within the various countries and also by taking advantage of any, even the

smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even conditional. Those who do not understand this reveal a failure to understand even the smallest grain of Marxism, of modern scientific socialism in general. Those who have not proved in practice, over a fairly considerable period of time and in fairly varied political situations, their ability to apply this truth in practice have not yet learned to keep the revolutionary class in its struggle to emancipate all toiling humanity from exploiters. And this applies equally to the period before and after the proletariat has won political power. (28)

We have already asserted that in principle we are not opposed to alliances with other working class parties. Such alliances can be forged but without making any theoretical concessions and provided they serve the ultimate interests of the proletarian revolution. Provided such alliances do not cause confusion and demoralisation of the working class.

It is a general characteristic of the Stalinists that they abstract some quotation and use it out of context for their own opportunistic purposes. This is what they have done here. Does the view expressed by Lenin in the above quotation negate his previous and future writings on this very subject of 'alliances'? Absolutely not. Every quotation must be read in its proper context and it must be applied dialectically. Of course Lenin is right when he advocated that it is the duty of the vanguard of the proletariat to exploit the contradictions within the exploiting class and use it for the benefit of the working class and to further the revolutionary aims. Taking advantage of conflict of interest among different sections of the bourgeoisie does not mean making a 'United Front' Government with one section of the bourgeoisie including communal parties, against another.

In the quotation in question, Lenin had castigated the German left, who had revolted against the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany, because it was seeking to form a coalition with the Independent Social-Democratic Party of Germany. Lenin criticised those on the German Left who could not appreciate the changed conditions in a Germany vanquished by the Entente Powers. British and particularly French Imperialism were mercilessly oppressing Germany through the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. It was lying prostrate in front of American monopoly capitalism to pay reparation to the victors. It was not accidental when Lenin included Germany who had 'suffered defeat at the hands of big imperialist powers (sic)', in the category of 'oppressed nations'. Lenin meant to apply all the tactics adopted at the third congress of the Communist International in Germany. That is to say, in Germany like other colonial and semi-colonial countries, the Communist party could make temporary alliances even with a bourgeois democratic party.

Secondly, when Lenin advised to take 'advantage of every, even the smallest opportunity of gaining a mass ally even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional', he was not referring to bourgeois and communal parties like Bangla Congress, or Muslim League. By 'mass ally' he meant those Social Democrat parties led by the heroes of the Second International. Lenin was answering the German Left who had written in the 'Frankfurt pamphlet': '... One must emphatically reject all compromises with



other parties . . . all policies of manoeuvring and agreement.' (29) 'German Lefts' were bitter about the betrayal of the Kautskyites and their organisation. It was with this party—the mass ally—they refused to enter into compromise and agreement. The question at issue with the German Left was not an alliance with a bourgeois party but with the revisionist Independent Social-Democratic Party.

'United Front' politics did not go unopposed in the CPI (M). Certain sections of the party especially from Andhra, charged the Stalinist leadership with making alliances with the 'known reactionary' parties. The Polit Bureau of CPI (M) dismissed this 'charge' with the plea that alliances with the reactionary parties are not 'forbidden' by Marxism-Leninism. In its defence the Polit Bureau cites (of course out of context) the alliance of the Communist Party of China with Chiang Kai-Shek in 1936. The Polit Bureau pleaded: 'May we also know from them [Party Members from Andhra], **granting** that all these are 'definitely reactionary' parties, whether the formation of such a front with them against the Congress party and government is forbidden by Marxism-Leninism of the new epoch? If so, can they enlighten us as to how the Chinese Communists could advocate a united front against Japanese imperialism with Chiang Kai-Shek, the representative of the most reactionary comprador class in China.' (30)(Emphasis added) The very use of the word 'granting' in the above quotation means that the Stalinist leadership does not admit the reactionary nature of Muslim League, Akali Dal or Bangla Congress. Gentlemen of the Polit Bureau, Marxism is a **science of contradictions**. A Marxist approaches a problem dialectically not metaphysically or mechanically. He takes concrete conditions into consideration and analyses it from all the angles.

If the alliance of the CPC with Chiang Kai-Shek in 1936 had proved beneficial under certain **concrete conditions**, that does not mean that it has become a historical law. It cannot be concluded from this that the working class can draw benefits from such alliances with the 'reactionary parties' in all periods of history. These gentlemen have forgotten that the disaster to the Chinese Revolution of 1925-27 was brought about **precisely** because of such an alliance with Chiang Kai Shek. That very alliance did not take the movement any further, rather it destroyed the revolution! The Communist Ministers in the Kuomintang Government and Mao Tse-tung as head of the Political Department of Peasantry, had played the most counter-revolutionary role. They checked the movements of the workers and peasants, because the CPC was afraid that if their movements were not checked, then the alliance with the Koumintang would come to an end. And the wreckage of this tragic alliance would have displeased the master of this drama - J.Stalin who was engaged in a life and death struggle against Trotsky and the Left opposition, precisely on this very issue. Trotsky and the Left opposition were opposed to this very alliance which was endangering the Chinese Revolution and which was making the counter-revolutionary forces formidable.

The Communist Ministers in the bourgeois State Assembly cannot be anything but captives of the ruling classes. The report made at Seventh Plenum of International Committee of Communist International by Tang Ping Sham—the Communist Minister of agriculture in the Kuomintang Government—proves our assertion correct. Tang Ping Sham

reported: 'We sacrificed the interests of workers and peasants in practice ... After lengthy negotiations with us the government did not accept the demands of the peasantry, which we presented to in the name of various social organisations. When the conflict arose between the large landowners and poor peasants, the government always took the side of the former.' (31) The CPC acted as a brake when it began to discipline the rising tide of peasant masses which had begun to try the big landlords and 'evil gentry' in the courts of peasant associations.

What was the result of that alliance? What was the result of sending Communist Ministers into the Kuomintang? To begin with, it destroyed the Chinese Revolution of 1925-27. Tens of thousands of Communist workers and peasants were slain in cold blood. Death is always welcome providing one dies fighting against one's class enemy. The Chinese workers and the peasants did not die fighting, but were sacrificed on the altar of the Kuomintang slaughter house. They were slaughtered because their leaders did not prepare them, did not arm them. Because their leaders stuck to the so-called 'U.F.' with the Kuomintang rather than organising the workers and peasants in Soviets. That was the penalty the Chinese working class and the peasantry paid for making an alliance with the reactionary Kuomintang ie Chiang Kai-Shek.

The examples of France, Spain, Ceylon, Bolivia, and the recent example of Chile can be cited in this context where the 'UF Governments' have proved as instruments in the hands of the ruling classes to retard the rising tide of revolutions. And these gentlemen of the Polit Bureau shamelessly ask if 'the formation of such a front with' the reactionary parties, 'against the Congress party is forbidden by Marxism-Leninism of the new epoch.' Let Lenin defend himself against these vulgar Marxists. It is the revisionists, said Lenin, who abandon class struggles, who advocate, 'alliances with the progressive, social-reformist bourgeoisie against the reactionaries.' (32)

The reader should note, Lenin was chastising those revisionists who advocated formation of alliance with **progressive, social reformist bourgeoisie** against reactionaries. What would Lenin have said about these Stalinists who advocate 'United Front' with the 'definitely' known reactionaries against another reactionary party? Lenin would have branded them not as revisionists but as counter-revolutionaries!

The Stalinists have tried their utmost, though unsuccessfully, to justify their 'United Front' with bourgeois-democratic and bourgeois-communal parties. Every attempt has been made to misuse Lenin's quotations and to distort them. Lenin has taught that alliances with the liberal bourgeoisie only blunt the consciousness of the masses; that they weaken rather than enhance the actual significance of their struggle'. (33) We shall soon observe from the record of the United Front Government that Lenin's experienced warning proved correct.

### 'U.F. GOVERNMENT' IN OPERATION

According to the CPI (M): 'The U.F. Government that we have now is to be **treated and understood as an instrument of struggle in the hands of the people**, more than as Governments that actually and substantially give relief to the people'. (Emphasis in original) And, 'In clear class terms, our Party's participation in such Governments is one specific form of struggle to win more and more people, and more and more allies for the

proletariat and its allies in the struggle for the cause of Peoples' Democracy and at a later stage for socialism'. (34) (Emphasis added)

A Government which works within the framework of Indian constitution, that is within the framework of bourgeois property relations, cannot under any circumstances be called an 'instrument' in the hands of the people. That Government will remain a **bourgeois government**. Participation of the 'Marxists' in such government does not change its character—it changes **theirs!** The reader would soon see who was an 'instrument' in whose hands.

The Stalinists who dominated the U.F. Government in Kerla and West Bengal failed to turn the engine of oppression of the bourgeoisie into the 'instrument of struggle' of the people. The engine of oppression in these States kept on rolling on the skulls of the working class and peasants as before. The only difference which can be noticed is that this time the engine was driven by the Stalinists of CPI (M). Let us briefly enumerate a few of their notorious deeds to prove our contention. Referring to the 'industrial policy' statement of his government, Namoodripad admitted

that some of the passages in the state-ment 'may well go contrary to the right of the working class for collective bargaining and their freedom of organisation and struggle and that industrialists were unanimous in acclaiming it. (*Peoples' Democracy*, January 14, 1968)

Is there any difference between the Tory Government of Heath, which ruthlessly attacks the democratic rights of the British working class and the Government led by 'Marxist' Namoodripad who shamelessly admits his attacks on the basic democratic rights of the Indian working class? Still they shamelessly claim that the U.F. Government is an 'instrument of struggle in the hands of the people'! Let us take an example of the Iddiki project where the 'instrument of struggle' of Namoodripad showered bullets on the unarmed workers, working under sub-human conditions. Before we describe this horrible incident and shameless slaughter of the workers by the Stalinists, let us first understand under what inhuman conditions the workers were made to work there. Mr Ramji reported in *Frontier* on May 4, 1968: 'Nearly four thousand people had been working there, clearing forests, blasting rocks, building tunnels on some of the toughest jobs under sub-human conditions . . . Even primary, rock-bottom amenities were denied to the workers, camping and working in the inhospitable wilderness. **Many cases occurred in which the bodies of the workers involved in fatal accidents were disposed of without a trace.** The contractors wielded tyrannical powers through their sword-arm, represented by a tough bank of men brought from Bombay, which included hard-core professional goondas too . . . ' **Wage-slaves**, in fact, were working as **semi-slaves**. The semi-slaves put forward a demand for a wage increase of 35 paises (about one pence) in their daily wages. On rejection of their demands, the workers gheraced the bungalow of the contractor on February 25, 1969. According to M.N. Govinder Nair, the Electricity Minister, on February 27, 'the contractor sought police help which was **promptly given.**' (35) (Emphasis added) And the Stalinist Government, that is, the 'instrument of struggle' in the hands of the working class, opened fire on the heads of the working class. According to a conservative estimate, two workers were reported



to be dead and several seriously injured.

The Stalinist leadership is notorious for mis-reporting to the cadres in branches. In the above cases the reporting is made as follows. CPI (M) will hold Nair, the Right Stalinist, responsible, as he was Electricity Minister. CPI, on the other hand, would hold Namboodripad responsible as he was in charge overall. Both would publicly blame the police which acted arbitrarily and would hold a judicial enquiry in to the matter!

Let us cite a case where Namboodripad was directly involved and was directly responsible. 'The employees of Namboodripad's government were agitating for some time on some very just demands. When the 'Marxist'-led government refused to accede to them, seven hundred employees of the Kerala Secretariat went on one day's mass casual leave. Namboodripad and his men responded by imposing a salary cut of one day and, what is most astounding of all, ordering a break of service of these several hundred employees. That amounts to treating them as new entrants, who are forced to lose the benefit of all previous increments, seniority in service, etc. and to start anew from the lowest rung of the ladder.' (36)

It is interesting to note that in many other States too the government employees had gone on 'mass casual leave'. But no congress government could have dared to impose one day salary cut and order a break in their service. This shamelessly notorious precedent was established by no other than the 'Marxist' Namboodripad, the head of the 'instrument of struggle'.

On Vietnam Day in 1968, the militant youth of Kerla demonstrated against the American bombardment of Vietnam. The angry youth expressing its solidarity with the people of Vietnam—whose dwellings and hearths are being razed to the ground every day—set a van belonging to the U.S. Consulate on fire.

The 'Marxist' Chief Minister Namboodripad, instead of demanding the unconditional withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, instead of raising the slogan, 'Down with the American Imperialist War' and 'Long Live the Heroic Fighters of Vietnam' instead of showing the solidarity with the people of Vietnam along with the Indian youth, he in his letter to the American Consulate, expressed 'deep personal regret' for this incident, and promised to take severe action against the miscreant youth! The 'Marxist' Namboodripad was pained to see a van burnt, no matter how American Imperialism is hell bent on burning the whole of Vietnam! Contrary to the contention of the 'instrument of struggle' of the Stalinists, the working masses in India and all over the world would like to see American imperialism and its war machine burnt to ashes.

It was again the 'instrument of struggle' of the Stalinists which under the pressure of the ruling classes at New Delhi, launched a diabolical attack on the Naxalites. On December 15, 1968, Mr. Morarji Dasai gave a stern warning to the Namboodripad Government to check the 'lawlessness' created by the Naxalites. In case of failure, he warned, the centre would intervene. On the instructions of his master at New Delhi, Namboodripad pounced on the Naxalites like a mad dog and arrested a large number of them. His police brutally tortured Ajetha, Philips, Prasad and many others. The ruling class always gives the name of 'lawlessness' to every revolutionary movement, to strikes of the

workers, student agitations, etc which hit directly or indirectly the established bourgeois property relations. And in the name of restoring 'peace', the ruling class and its lackeys, like Namboodripad and Joyti Basu, use their positions to crush such movements with heavy hands.

Here, we are not suggesting that the Naxalite movement is a **revolutionary movement** in the sense that it can take the working class to power. No party which is based on **terrorism** and which does not understand or concretely apply Marxism-Leninism, can take the working class to power. In spite of all theoretical bankruptcy of the Naxalites, it can be said without exaggeration that their sincerity for the cause of revolution is indisputably genuine. Only the agents like Joyti Basu of the bourgeoisie would call the self-sacrificing youth of the Naxalites an 'anti-social element' or CIA agents.

**We have deep political and theoretical differences with the Maoist Naxalites and we shall wage a merciless political and theoretical struggle against them. But we shall not allow their persecution either by the ruling classes or their agents. We shall unconditionally defend them with every means at our command against the attacks of the class enemy and its agents. Nor shall we give a second thought to defend even the Stalinists against the bourgeois onslaught.**

Lenin did not, even for a moment, doubt the sincerity of the Narodniks. But he never agreed with their programme and he waged a ruthless theoretical struggle against the Narodnik terrorism. Unlike the Stalinists, he never betrayed them to Czarist reaction. But Namboodripad and Joyti Basu took up the jobs of executioners on behalf of the ruling classes. Such instances are not new in history. The Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries under the leadership of Kerensky had undertaken such dirty jobs of trampling underfoot the whole of Bolshevism. The Stalinists have branded the Naxalites as anti-social and CIA agents. Such charges are not new either. The Kerensky government had branded Lenin as a German agent and later, following the reactionary footsteps of Kerensky, Stalin brought a similar charge against Trotsky, Lenin's comrade in arms. Revolutionary crises threw the Indian Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries into the laps of the Indian bourgeoisie. They were more enthusiastic to crush the Naxalites than the bourgeoisie itself.

Though West Bengal was the worst scene of Naxalite execution, yet we shall cite a case from Kerla dealt by Namboodripad. This is a case of historical importance in the history of the Communist Movement. On March 22, 1969, UNI reported:

'AIR [All India Radio] in a report from its Trivandrum correspondent, said the police had seized and produced in court several letters alleged to have been written by Chinese embassy officials to some 141 accused in this case. Some of the documents provided prove that the accused **drew inspiration from the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung.**

'The charge-sheet presented to the Kozhikode District Magistrate by the State police said that **the accused were guided by Mao's violent ideology and propagated it . . .** The accused had also declared their intention to capture rural bases first so that they could surround the cities and towns later . . . They . . . established units in various parts of the State and **tried to take advantage of the discontented among the workers and Kisans [peasants].'** (Emphasis added)

So we see, in the 'Marxist' governed State of Kerala, the propagation of the Marxist theory of the State and of violent revolution had become a crime. It had become a crime in Kerala to draw inspiration from Mao Tse-tung's thought that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun'. Mao has added nothing new in the Marxist ideology of violent revolution.

He said in a more popular way what Marx had said, that 'force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with the new one'. A revolution according to Engels, is achieved by 'means of rifles, bayonets, and cannon.'

Yet the so-called 'Marxist' Namboodripad thoroughly committed to the Stalinist theory of peaceful transition to Socialism, declared all those people adhering to the Marxist theory of violent revolution to be **criminals**. It is the ruling class and its agents who ban Marxist literature and declare those workers who draw inspiration from it to be criminals. Namboodripad earned a great notoriety for standing shoulder to shoulder with Morarji Dasai.

What was the attitude of the Right Stalinists in this case?

Mr Dange who was 'shocked' to read the Naxalite case in the newspaper, sent a telegram to Namboodripad. He reminded him that the charges brought by him against the Naxalites are 'almost identical' to those that the British Indian Government had brought against the Communist Party of India in the 'Bolshevik Conspiracy Case' of 1924 and 'Meerut Conspiracy Case' of 1929. Therefore Dange, in his telegram, suggested to Namboodripad 'to drop the political platform of his prosecution case and only deal with that part which alleges overt criminal acts.' (Emphasis added)

Dange in no way favoured the release of the political offenders. He argued to convert the political charges into criminal charges, that is, to deprive the political offenders even of the privileges given to them in the bourgeois jails. The Stalinists took exactly the same position in relation to the Naxalites, as the British imperialists had done in relation to the Indian masses. These pseudo-Marxists have given an indisputable confirmation that they are 'agents' of the ruling class. And still they shamelessly claim these 'U.F. governments' as 'instruments of struggle in the hands of the people', and 'to win more and more allies'! The cases cited above are sufficient to reveal the 'general' line pursued by the Stalinists. There remains not even an iota of doubt about their counter-revolutionary nature. Nevertheless for readers' information, we shall add one or two other examples, even at the expense of lengthening the article, about how the Stalinists used the 'instrument of struggle' to **destroy** 'more and more allies'.

On February 27, 1969, the police of Joyti Basu fired tear gas shells and lathi-charged the workers in **Kidderpore dock area** to win more and more allies! What was the crime of the workers? They had demanded that their **temporary staff** be made **permanent**.

Though the CPI (M) claimed the U.F. Government 'more than as Governments that actually and substantially give relief to the people'. Yet Joyti Basu gave 'relief' to the workers by ordering his police 'to take action according to law' (37) Several workers were injured and twenty-one were arrested! That was done to 'win more and more allies



for the proletariat'.

The Police attack on the May Day demonstration and its diabolical attack on Eden Hindu Hostel to destroy the Naxalite students is a notorious chapter in the history of the U.F. Government of West Bengal. According to Amrita Bazar Patrika, May 3, 1969, '... the Police also fired several rounds of tear gas shells **all directed towards** the Naxalites ... Supporters of the Brigade Parade Grounds rally were seen breaking the loud-speakers installed at the Naxalites' meeting ground at the foot of the monument.'

On March 24, 1969, the CRP opened fire on the workers in Durgapur Steel Plant. Joyti Basu evades responsibility for this massacre. He pretends to be absent from Calcutta. Secondly he throws blame on the Central Government on whose orders the CRP opened fire. Two years after this event, in his pamphlet *Cry Halt to this Reign of Terror* he described this massacre as an 'attempt to discredit the U.F. Government' by the Central Government. But Basu does not reveal in his pamphlet how the incident took place. And what action his government and his party took against this 'interference' by the centre! Did Joyti Basu resign in protests against this massacre? Did his party mobilise the working class and organise a general strike to kick the Congress out? No. The Stalinists being the accomplice did not and could not mobilise the working class! If in March it was the CRP, then we see in April Basu's police charging ferociously the working class on the May Day demonstration!

The hands of the Stalinists—Namboodripad's and Joyti Basu's are red with the blood of the workers and peasants. No amount of hand washing could remove these stains!

During the election campaign of 1969 and immediately after victory, Basu made it clear what he meant by 'instrument of struggle'. In order to catch the petty-bourgeois votes, Joyti Basu declared in his pamphlet in Bengali, *Why You Should Vote for the United Front*:

'It is a congress propaganda that we shall forcibly take away the land and property of individuals. **Never.** (!) The United Front government carried on administration for nine months. Was the property of a single individual touched? No, it was not done.'

If there is any meaning in Basu's declaration, it is this: the Congress propaganda brands us Communists. But we are not Communists. We are faithful boot lickers of the bourgeoisie. **Never** shall we dare to nationalise any of the means of production. And the U.F. Government shall remain, as before, an instrument of oppression in the hands of Birla and Tata.

The reader may say that our criticism of the Stalinists is too severe to be justified. Very well, allow us to cite another quotation from the speech of Joyti Basu. And let the reader form his own judgment. After the electoral victory on February 14, 1969, Joyti Basu declared in a public meeting that, 'many businessmen had rung him (Joyti Basu) yesterday and today and had wanted to see him. If they accepted the **legitimate** demands of the workers, the businessmen had nothing to fear ... The new Government was ready to **help big businessmen** to get their orders sanctioned by Delhi. They might even **collaborate** with foreign firms.'

*Statesman*, Feb. 15, 1969. (Emphasis added)

Joyti Basu would do his utmost even to 'help the **big businessmen**' who might 'even collaborate with the foreign firms' to fleece the Indian masses!

If the 'leaders' of the working class can commit themselves to this extent, then they are the best guarantee for big business! Danges and Basus being leaders of the trade unions are better equipped than the Congressmen to help the big businessmen and to slow down the march of the working class. Their betrayal of the landless peasant masses was similar. Hare Krishan Konar—the General Secretary of All India Kisan Sabha—had condemned the land laws enacted by the Congress governments. He had raised the slogan: 'Abolition of landlordism without compensation, and free distribution of land among the agricultural workers and poor peasants.' After he was appointed Land and Land Revenue Minister by Joyti Basu, he suddenly became a **Congressite**. He began to see **virtues in the congress land laws**. Before he came to power, he used to argue that genuine land reforms:

'Cannot be achieved by **amending the existing laws** or by carrying on a movement for **correct implementation** of those laws within the **present set up** . . . genuine, radical land reforms cannot be carried out by amending existing laws or by relying on the bureaucracy for implementing them.' (38) (Emphasis added) These were the words Konar uttered in West Bengal Provincial Kisan Sabha in October 1967.

We ask the reader to compare the above lines of double faced Konar, 'the Marxist', with what he said in an interview with the representative of the *Statesman* on March 18, 1969. Paying commendable tribute to Konar the *Statesman* reported: 'In a note prepared for the cabinet Mr Konar had little to blame the existing land legislation. . . . the note says that pending amendments of different land legislations [Quotes from Konar's notes] 'much can be done to retrieve the position if the whole administration machinery is geared up and if proper and timely measures are taken at all levels to implement the existing provisions.' (Emphasis in original)

Previously, land reform could not be achieved **even by amending the existing laws within the present set-up**. And later when he became Minister, he could 'retrieve the position' even without amending the existing laws! Previously, bourgeois bureaucracy was incapable and could not be relied upon to implement the land laws and later the same bourgeois bureaucracy became capable of implementing these laws! The miserable land reforms Act of Namboodripad and subterfuge fight for the amendment of the existing land laws by Joyti Basu and Konar is an apostasy of 'Abolition of landlordism without compensation . . .' This means to fall in line with congressites and make concessions to the ruling classes. Nothing short of agrarian revolution—nationalisation of the means of agricultural production under rural workers' control—engineered by the proletarian revolution can solve the problems of the miserable conditions of the Indian working masses.

## TO THE CADRES OF CPI AND CPI (M)

We have already explained how the Stalinists have completely abandoned Marxist theory and practice. The Marxist-Leninist theory is the key to understanding the counter-revolutionary policies pursued by the Stalinists. Most of the CPI and CPI(M) cadres who may agree with our analysis, nevertheless ask us the question what we would have done, had we been in their position? Although the question is badly formulated since we would not be in their position, let us nevertheless examine how a revolutionary leadership faced with similar problems would have acted.

Firstly, in relation to the Popular front governments of Kerala and West Bengal, which were led by the CPI (M), we say that we would never form a government with parties such as the Bangala Congress and the Muslim League. The very existence of these governments was based on a minimum programme, which was, of course, a bourgeois programme. In such a situation communist ministers cannot act as catalysts in intensifying the class struggle; instead they would become the developing combativity of the masses; they become errand boys for the bourgeoisie and in this sense perform an invaluable service to the bourgeoisie for by their actions they confine the class struggle within the limits of bourgeois legality and reforms. If any attempt were to be made to transcend the bounds of the minimum programme the popular front government would inevitably break up. If we review the history of the 'United front' governments we will see that in order to stabilise these coalitions the CPI (M) ministers had to use organs of bourgeois repression, particularly the Police force in order to suppress the movements of workers and peasants. By such anti-working class actions it is the CPI (M) and the CPI that get discredited and not their bourgeois allies. If the bourgeoisie was blocking the path of even bourgeois reforms, then even from the point of CPI (M)'s own position, the only honourable course open for them was to get out of the 'United Front' government thus exposing the real nature of these 'radical' bourgeoisie to the masses. Thereafter they should have sought direct support from the workers and peasants by organising them in workers' councils etc. Furthermore they should have broken the fetters of the minimum programme and initiated revolutionary measures in the agrarian sector with the object of giving the land to the tiller etc. Similarly they could have encouraged workers control in the Factories established district and street committees to control distribution of



essential commodities as well as controlling prices etc. In other words use the positions they had to initiate the embryos of an alternative state structure. Even if such a movement fails due to the intervention of the army etc it would mark an enormous leap in the political consciousness of not only the masses in West Bengal or Kerala but also in every nook and cranny of India. It would have been a historical experience for the whole working class movement, and would have greatly strengthened the self-confidence of the masses. Above all it would at least have shown to the masses of the whole sub-continent an invaluable lesson in self-activity and self organisation. Instead the Stalinists chose another solution—that of sending the police to hound out the workers who were merely demanding a small wage rise or assurances about their jobs from their government.

Secondly, it follows from this that a revolutionary leadership will consistently educate the working class and its allies about the manoeuvres of the bourgeoisie and its government and systematically combat bourgeois ideology and propaganda. But the political practice of the CPI and the CPI (M), by its support for the manoeuvres of the bourgeois governments, has in fact reinforced the illusions of the backward sections of the masses. If we take just two recent examples, the nationalisation of the 14 Banks by the Congress government or more importantly on the occasion of India's intervention in Bangladesh, we see how these parties were not only outflanked by the bourgeoisie but also how they were forced to follow a policy of tail ending the Congress government. On the occasion of the Bank nationalisations (or more accurately state control) the duty of a revolutionary leadership would have been to explain to the masses the real meaning of such measures; they would have explained that these measures were designed to (a) assist and facilitate capital formation, primarily, to meet the needs of big capital and (b) to resolve certain fiscal and budgetary problems of the government. Since they could be passed off as a 'socialist' measure they also had important propaganda value. Such nationalisations in no way weakened the bourgeois property system or the bourgeois state. However, both the CPI and the CPI (M) made no such critique; instead they gave almost unqualified support for these measures and failed to make even the most elementary point that the Congress government had—despite its socialist rhetoric—judiciously refrained from making any moves against the foreign banks.

Until the end of 1971, when the Indian army intervened in Bangladesh, both CPI and the CPI (M) had an excellent opportunity, not only to assist the struggle in Bangladesh but also strengthen the revolutionary elements who were gradually beginning to emerge as the leading fighters of the liberation movement. Throughout this period the revolutionaries in Bangladesh had many problems—lack of arms training facilities etc. The camps set up by the Indian army in collaboration with the Awami league elements, turned away hundreds of young men who were suspected of being leftists. The CPI and CPI (M) could have launched a massive opera-

tion to support these elements, to train them and provide them all the necessary material support. It could have not only helped the revolutionary elements to gain hegemony in the liberation movement, but also exposed the real intentions of the Indhira government—because concealed behind that thin facade of ‘humanitarian concern’ of the Congress government its real intentions were (a) to weaken its rival power—Pakistan, (b) to foist Mujib Rehaman and his men on Bangladesh and to (c) prevent the Bangladesh struggle developing beyond the borders of East Bengal, in particular into West Bengal. An organisation with less than half the resources and influence of the CPI (M) could have launched a campaign in support of the Bangladesh struggle which would have effectively defeated the aims of the Indian bourgeoisie and yet forced it into a position where it could not move against the revolutionary left. The mass support for the Bangladesh struggle was such that it would have been impossible to suppress such a movement without risking the outbreak of mass revolts in every part of the country. The Stalinists failed to do this. The very same CPI (M) leadership who had declared that Indhira and Yahiya were the same, only a few days before the outbreak of the Bangladesh struggle, now became tame supporters of the same ‘fascist’ (as they used to call her) Indhira. Meanwhile the Indhira government exploited to the maximum the chauvinist hysteria they succeeded in generating over the Bangladesh issue. Thus an explosive situation which could have engulfed the whole sub-continent in a revolutionary convulsion was defused by the Indian bourgeoisie with the invaluable assistance of the Stalinists. In a few months time the CPI (M) reaped the fruits of this opportunism when the CRP and the Chattar Parishad together began to eliminate literally hundreds of CPI (M) cadre, under the cover of ‘Defence of India regulations’.

Thirdly, the revolutionary leadership capable of leading the exploited masses to victory and conquest of power cannot be built by horse-dealing, manoeuvres and bureaucratic constrictions. This means that within the party there must be the opportunity for greatest possible democratic discussion and exchange of ideas; the rank and file of the party must be able to test the political line of the leadership in practice, to change the leadership and fight to re-orient the party in a revolutionary direction when they feel it is moving away from its objectives. Outside the party, within the broad working class movement, every revolutionary party must ensure that all other socialist currents and organisations are allowed to express their views democratically. If we look at the political practice of the CPI (M) and the CPI we see that they not only prevent democratic political debate and discussion internally but also prevent other political currents from expressing themselves by bureaucratic, physical and other means. In particular they use bourgeois state apparatus against other left currents. The CPI (M) in particular, have denounced its dissidents to the police (eg Comrade Kuchelar in Madras) and used the police to fight other political currents, particularly the Naxalite cadres. The fear of political ideas has been one of the worst features of Stalinist parties and this continues to plague the CPI and the CPI (M).

Finally, a revolutionary Marxist party cannot be conceived within a national framework because without a global struggle against imperialism and its allies, both in theory and practice, any working class party would sooner or later come under the influence of chauvinism and nationalism; it begins to reflect, albeit in a distorted manner, the interests of its own bourgeoisie. When the Bolsheviks struggled to build the Third International they recognised the enormous task of struggling against such pressures; that is in transcending the purely national peculiarities and furthering the interests of the world working class. But after the defeat of international revolutions and the accession of Stalin to power, the Third International degenerated and became a mere instrument of Soviet foreign policy. And after the World War II, it was finally dissolved. Today, as in the past, most pro-Moscow Communist parties are no more than appendages of the Soviet Communist party, mere mouth pieces of the Soviet bureaucracy. This is more or less the same with parties that support China—though more grotesque because they adopt even the literary style of the new 'Mandarins' of China. Therefore we need not say very much about them. The CPI (M), however, claims that it is independent of both Moscow and Peking, although when they split with the CPI, they supported China. And yet it has not made a critical assessment of its past political history. It has the doubtful honour of being an independent and a national communist party—a contradiction in terms. In our opinion it is necessary to build a Bolshevik party in India (as in other countries) but such a party cannot be built without it being an integral part of a Bolshevik International, otherwise it would end up practising the same type of opportunist meanderings of the CPI (M).

This is by no means an exhaustive list, but only a few examples of the opportunist and counter-revolutionary political theory and practice of the stalinists. In our opinion a very clear message emerges from a Marxist analysis of the history and current practice of the CPI and the CPI (M); and that is that both these parties are incapable of leading the Indian masses to the conquest of power; they will continue to lead them to defeat and disaster. This inevitably leads to the conclusion that unless the revolutionary elements who still follow the CPI and CPI (M) leadership decisively break with their politics, they will not be able to contribute to the urgent task of building a Bolshevik party and a Bolshevik International that could lead the Indian working class and its allies to achieve its historic tasks.

**PRIT SAPPAL**



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